Trade Liberalisation and Agglomeration with Firm Heterogeneity - Forward and Backward Linkages

Toshihiro Okubo
Graduate Institute of International Studies

Abstract
This paper studies the impact of trade costs reduction on geographical concentration in the presence of firm heterogeneity and overhead type of export fixed costs. Firm heterogeneity with the export fixed costs hampers full agglomeration through weakening the forward and backward linkages and fortifying the market crowding effect. Rather than catastrophic agglomeration that the standard new economic geography models have long suggested, trade liberalisation causes gradual agglomeration. Also, trade liberalisation never produces a perfect convergence in welfare for the periphery, which loses, and the core, which gains. Even free trade never equalises the welfare between core and periphery, i.e. trade liberalisation does not eliminate inequality among nations.

JEL H32, P16.

Keywords: heterogeneous firms, economic geography, spatial sorting effect, non-full agglomeration, non-catastrophic agglomeration, trade liberalisation.
Trade Liberalisation and Agglomeration with Firm Heterogeneity----Forward and Backward Linkages

Toshihiro Okubo
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
April 2006

ABSTRACT

This paper studies the impact of trade costs reduction on geographical concentration in the presence of firm heterogeneity and overhead type of export fixed costs. Firm heterogeneity with the export fixed costs hampers full agglomeration through weakening the forward and backward linkages and fortifying the market crowding effect. Rather than catastrophic agglomeration that the standard new economic geography models have long suggested, trade liberalisation causes gradual agglomeration. Also, trade liberalisation never produces a perfect convergence in welfare for the periphery, which loses, and the core, which gains. Even free trade never equalises the welfare between core and periphery, i.e. trade liberalisation does not eliminate inequality among nations.

JEL H32, P16.

Keywords: heterogeneous firms, economic geography, spatial sorting effect, non-full agglomeration, non-catastrophic agglomeration, trade liberalisation.

1. INTRODUCTION

The last few decades have witnessed a remarkably large reduction in trade costs and trade barriers through trade liberalisation and also a high spatial concentration in industries. Krugman and Venables (1995) suggested that trade liberalisation first creates a core-periphery structure and divergence in real income across nations but finally could at even lower trade costs produce convergence in real income in the world. This tells us that trade liberalisation would ultimately eliminate inequality between nations.

However, reality might be different from such a hopeful prediction. Regardless of trade liberalisation, the real income gap between the richest and poorest countries in the world is still vast. The per-capita income converges only among the OECD countries while divergence can be found within the developing world (UNCTAD, 1997). In other words, in the process of trade liberalisation, the post-war globalisation displays a twin-peaks economic convergence with the rich nations getting richer and the poor nations remaining poor (Baldwin and Martin, 2000; Jones, 1997). In fact, some developing countries fall further behind because of trade liberalisation (Dollar and Kraay, 2004). Along with this evidence, one often sees small developing nations opposing trade and trade-related liberalisation and the liberalisation process...
reaching a deadlock. The trade liberalisation in the real world seems to involve much more pessimistic outcomes and even more bitter struggles than we have thought.

This paper studies how trade liberalisation affects industrial location and never produces a perfect convergence of real income and welfare in the world, taking into account economic geography. To demonstrate this, we incorporate the vertical linkage (VL) model of Krugman and Venables (1995) in the NEG literature with heterogeneous-firms trade model by Melitz (2003) and study the impact of trade and TBTs liberalisation on firm relocation and agglomeration, and on welfare.

1.1. Literature review

Liberalisation and Inequality

International trade is sometimes thought to be one of the causes for many types of inequalities. For example, related to the income inequality within the domestic economy, the relative increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s is generated by the growing intermediate goods trade associated with international outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1997 and 2001). Closer to this paper, the currently well-known heterogeneous-firms trade models have sought to demonstrate how trade liberalisation affects firms differently (Melitz, 2003; Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2005; Falvey, Greenaway and Yu, 2004; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2004; Baldwin and Forslid, 2004). Trade liberalisation raises only exporters’ profits while reducing local producers’ profits (share shifting effect) and pushes the least efficient local producers from the market while inducing the most efficient local firms into export market (selection effect).

Shifting our attention to international inequality, Krugman (1981) suggested that the divergence is driven by technological externalities. Building on the new economic geography (NEG), Baldwin (1999) found divergence in real income due to capital accumulation in the neo-classical growth model, and Baldwin, Martin and Ottaviano (2001) found that the technological spillovers matter for the divergence. In Matsuyama (1991) and Krugman (1991a), differences in initial conditions (history) or in self-fulfilling expectations can explain why some economies benefit from geographical concentration and others stay in poverty. Krugman and Venables (1995) modelled vertical linkages of intermediate inputs as pecuniary externalities and suggested the divergence in real income between core and periphery at intermediate trade costs and finally convergence at still lower trade costs. This paper studies the inequality of nations due to trade liberalisation from the view point of the new economic geography model of Krugman and Venables (1995) incorporated with the heterogeneous-firms trade model of Melitz (2003).

Core-periphery, Vertical linkages and New Economic Geography

The last decade has seen the dramatic development of the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature, whose main undertaking was to endogenise the choice of industrial location. The most familiar NEG models are the Core-Periphery (CP) model by Krugman (1991b) and the vertical linkage (VL) model by Venables (1994, 1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995) (see also Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2003; Fujita and Thisse, 2002). The agglomeration is generated by labour migration

---

in the CP model and by input-output linkages in the VL model. Both CP and VL models are isomorphic in equilibrium properties. The most important features in both models the backward and forward linkages as agglomeration forces and the market crowding effect as dispersion force.

One of the current research avenues in NEG is to overcome the mathematical intractability of the CP and VL models and check the robustness of the existing NEG models. One of the common difficulties in VL and CP models are analytically unsolvable equilibria. Attempting to tackle this difficulty and to check the robustness of the VL model, the footloose entrepreneur (FE) model of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), the footloose capital vertical linkage (FCVL) model of Robert-Nicoud (2005, Appendix 2) and Baldwin et al. (2003, Ch.8) and the footloose entrepreneur vertical linkage (FEVL) model of Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2006) are successful in providing more tractable and substitutable theoretical frameworks. They demonstrate that all of these models are isomorphic with the standard CP and VL models in equilibrium features without losing all the key properties. In particular, the FCVL model proposed by Robert-Nicoud (2005) is the most tractable and simplest in a family of VL models, in which the VL model is married with the footloose capital (FC) model of Martin and Rogers (1995). The FCVL model never degenerates from the CP and VL models: It features backward and forward linkages, and the market crowding effect with circular causality and follows the same equilibrium path.

**Firm Heterogeneity and Geography**

Indeed, the VL model has reflected the important phenomenon of the vertical input-output linkage in creating industrial agglomeration, but the NEG models did not yet capture another important aspect revealed by a number of remarkable recent empirical studies. The current econometric analysis in the international trade and industrial organisation literature sheds light on actual firm behaviour. Along with the development of econometric techniques and the improvement of firm level data sets, much empirical evidence has been provided (Aw et al. 2000; Bernard and Jenson 1995, 1999; Bernard, Jenson and Schott 2003; Pavcnik, 2002; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995). The evidence highlighted how important intra-firm productivity differences are. As a response to this empirical evidence, Melitz (2003) has demonstrated that trade liberalisation raises industry productivity via a selection effect, as well as via a production reallocation effect (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2003; Falvey, Greenaway and Yu, 2004; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2004; Baldwin and Forslid, 2004). For brevity’s sake, we call these studies heterogeneous-firms trade (HFT) models. Although the HFT models’ main focus has been the trade liberalisation-driven selection effect through an entry and exit process and the change in firm behaviour, these previous studies were not directly linked to the NEG literature: They did not deal with the core issues of economic geography, namely firm migration, agglomeration/ dispersion forces and equilibrium stability, in spite of the remarkable evidence of delocation in Europe and offshoring in North America. To tackle this, Baldwin and Okubo (2006a), (2006b) incorporated the Melitz literature into the FC model of the NEG literature, which is in the line of this paper. They assumed away free entry and exit and instead modelled interregional firm relocation. Baldwin and Okubo (2006b) found that the presence of marginal costs discrepancies results in qualitatively different characteristics from the existing NEG literature: Firm heterogeneity dampens the agglomeration process and the big nation benefits from an extra-productivity gain as a result of

---


2 The FEVL and FCVL models feature agglomeration without labour migration, while sustaining all of the equilibrium features of the VL model (See Baldwin et al. 2003).
delocation, which cannot be captured by HFT models. However, both studies, Baldwin and Okubo (2006a) and (2006b), have no forward and backward linkages due to the simplest framework particular to the FC model, which definitely degenerates from the CP and VL models. In their models, agglomeration arises from asymmetric market sizes without self-reinforcing. By contrast, this paper uses the FCVL model with two symmetric-sized countries to sustain the most important features of the CP and VL models in a simple framework: forward and backward linkages and the market crowding effect. Thus, agglomeration in this paper is self-reinforcing through circular causality triggered by intermediate demand with firm heterogeneity.

The value added by the present paper lies in showing that 1) Firm heterogeneity per se cannot alter the main equilibrium features in the NEG, 2) Firm heterogeneity in the presence of export fixed costs à la Melitz (2003), by contrast, entirely changes the equilibrium features in the standard NEG model. Unlike CP and VL models, no catastrophic agglomeration occurs and instead gradual agglomeration takes place as trade gets freer. There is the possibility of non-full agglomeration and 3) Trade and TBTs liberalisation never leads to a perfect convergence in welfare. Even at free trade, defined as zero iceberg trade costs, the international welfare level never converges. All firms might prefer to locate in the core at free trade and, in contrast to Krugman and Venables (1995), the inequality of nations remains.

Plan of Paper
Reflecting the development of the NEG models and HFT models, this paper promotes the development of the VL models. We aim at examining the impact of firm heterogeneity on the VL model and discuss the equilibrium features. The rest of the paper is organised in five sections. Section 2 presents the basic model, after which Section 3 examines the equilibrium in the absence of export fixed costs. Section 4 explores the equilibrium and its features in the presence of export fixed costs. Then Section 5 presents the impact of trade and TBTs liberalisation on welfare. Finally, the concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.

2. THE BASIC MODEL

First, we introduce one application of the Vertical Linkages model, known as the footloose capital vertical linkage (FCVL) model, (see Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2003, Chapter 8 for a thorough analysis of this model and Robert-Nicoud, 2005, Appendix 2). Then, we add an extra assumption to generate firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003).

2.1. Footloose capital vertical linkage model

To build intuition, we start from the standard FCVL model of Robert-Nicoud (2005), which is the marriage of the footloose capital (FC) model of Martin and Rogers (1995) with the Vertical Linkage (VL) model. The FCVL model works with the same setup as the simplest FC model, i.e. two nations (the North and the South), two sectors (manufacturing and agriculture) and two factors (Labour and Capital). However, different from the standard FC model, two symmetric nations are referred to as initial equilibrium, and thus the two market sizes are initially identical. The two nations are symmetric in terms of tastes, technology, openness to trade, size,
and relative factor endowments of labour and capital. Thus the two nations have the same share of world labour (s_L = 0.5) and capital (s_K = 0.5), initially equal to the share of manufacturing ‘sn’ (=0.5). The two sectors will be referred to as the manufacturing sector (M) and agriculture (A) as numeraire sector. Manufacturing requires intermediate inputs through input-output linkages as in the original VL model, sustaining the richness of the model: forward and backward linkages and the market crowding effect.

The standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model assumes a two tier utility function with the upper tier being the Cobb-Douglas function and with the lower tier for manufactured goods being a CES function. Thus we assume:

\[
U = C_M^\mu C_A^{1-\mu}, \quad C_M \equiv \left( \int_{i \in \Theta} c_i^{1-\sigma} \, di \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}, \quad 0 < \mu < 1 < \sigma
\]

where \(C_M\) and \(C_A\) are, respectively, consumption of the M-sector varieties composite and consumption of the A-sector good, \(\sigma\) is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two M-sector varieties, \(\mu\) measures the share of M-sector varieties in total consumption and \(\Theta\) is the set of varieties available in one particular nation.

The numeraire sector, agriculture, is characterised by perfect competition, constant returns to scale and zero trade costs. Manufacturing is marked by increasing returns, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and iceberg trade costs (\(t \geq 1\)). Unlike the FC model, the FCVL model supposes intermediate goods are required to produce a M-good. As in the original VL model by Krugman and Venables (1995), manufactured goods are used as intermediate goods as well as consumer goods (final). Each manufacturing firm requires one unit of \(K\) as fixed costs and \(\alpha\) units of \(L\) per unit of output and intermediate goods (all varieties of manufacturing goods) as variable costs. In the variable cost part, labour and intermediate goods are subject to the Cobb-Douglas cost function. For simplicity, we assume \(\mu\) to be the share of intermediate goods in the variable cost function. Therefore a typical firm’s cost function can be represented as:

\[
\pi_i + \omega a \cdot x, P_p; \quad P_p = w^{1-\mu} (\bar{p})^{1-\sigma}, \quad \bar{p} \equiv \int_{i \in \Theta} p_i^{1-\sigma} \, di + \int_{h \in \Theta^*} p_h^{1-\sigma} \, dh, \quad \sigma > 1 \equiv 1-\sigma \geq 0
\]

where \(\pi\) and \(\omega\) are capital’s and labour’s reward, \(x\) is firm-level output and \(P_p\) refers to the producer price of the Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labour and the bundle of intermediate goods. The second term represents variable cost, i.e. the payment for labour and intermediate goods. \(p_i\) is variety-\(i\)’s producer price (which equals its consumer price since it is produced locally), and \(\bar{p}\) is the (weighted) average of prices of varieties sold in the North. The first term in the definition of \(\bar{p}\) represents the prices of goods that are produced in the North (and so bear no iceberg trade costs). The second term stands for the imported varieties whose producer prices are \(p_h\); \(\Theta\) and \(\Theta^*\) refer to sets of varieties that are produced in the North and the South, respectively. Note that the geometric weights are negative due to the regularity condition that \(\sigma>1\), and thus the weighted average price, \(\bar{p}\), falls as individual prices rise. A critical parameter in our paper is \(\phi\), namely the freeness of trade. Note that \(\phi\) ranges from zero when trade is prohibitive in autarchy (\(t=\infty\)) to unity when trade is perfectly free (\(t=0\)).

As in the standard FC and FCVL models, all capital is owned by capital owners and is mobile between nations, but capital owners and workers are inter-nationally immobile. Thus, capital rewards are repatriated across nations. Importantly, each capital owner in the North and the

---

4 In the FC model, the symmetric two nations are a stable equilibrium for any positive level of trade costs and thus full agglomeration never occurs, unlike in the FCVL model.

5 The cost function of a typical manufacturing firm in the FCVL model is non-homothetic; the fixed cost involves only capital and the variable cost involves not only labour but also intermediate goods.
South has a capital endowment consisting of a portfolio comprising an equal share of all firms’ stocks. By sharing all firms’ various levels of profits as stock holder, each owner’s capital reward is the average operating profits of all firms.

### 2.2. Intermediate results

The presence of the numeraire sector simplifies the results: constant returns, perfect competition and zero trade costs equalise nominal wage rates across nations ($w = w^* = 1$). What this means is that all differences in M-firms’ marginal costs are due to differences in their $a$’s so we can refer to the $a$’s as marginal cost without ambiguity.

The M-sector is subject to all the usual Dixit-Stiglitz results, where prices of good M are a constant mark-up over their marginal selling costs. In the local market, these marginal costs entail only production costs. The price in the export market includes the iceberg costs, $t \geq 1$, associated with the constant Dixit-Stiglitz mark-up. As a result of utility maximisation, we can work out a demand function for each variety of good M as

$$c_j = \left( \frac{p_j}{\bar{p}} \right)^{\alpha} \frac{\mu}{E}$$

where $E$ denotes total expenditure in the market. Southern demand functions are isomorphic.

Utility maximisation generates the familiar CES demand functions. These, together with the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition assumptions on market structure imply ‘mill pricing’ optimality and this in turn implies a constant operating profit margin, $1/\sigma$, where $\sigma > 1$ is the constant elasticity of substitution among varieties.\(^6\) Thus the operating profit that a firm earns in a particular market – denoted as $\pi$ – equals the value of the firm’s sales times $1/\sigma$. It proves convenient to write a firm’s market-specific sales as its market-specific market share, $s$, times total expenditure in the market ($E$). The Dixit-Stiglitz market share is a simple function of the firm’s price relative to the average price of all its competitors. Firm $j$’s prices in its local market and export market can be written as

$$p_i = \frac{a_i P_p}{1-1/\sigma}, \quad p_i^* = \frac{t a_i P_p}{1-1/\sigma}$$

where $t \geq 1$ represents the usual iceberg trade costs and $t$ units must be shipped in order to sell one unit in the export market (i.e. ‘$a$’ for local sales and ‘$ta$’ for export sales). Next, we characterise the northern expenditure on manufactures:

$$\mu E = \mu \left( Y + \int_{x \in \Theta} P_p a_j x_j \right)$$

where $Y$ is total income of northern workers and capital owners, $Y = s_L L^w + s_K \bar{K}^w$ (the endowment shares of labour and capital, $s_L$ and $s_K$, are equal to 0.5 by the assumption of equally distributed factor endowments), and the second term represents domestic intermediate demand. The northern total income $Y$ is composed of workers’ income and capital owners’ rewards. All capital owners in both nations are assumed to equally receive average operating profits, $\bar{\pi}$, regardless of country of residence due to the portfolio stock holder assumption.

Here, we assume that capital owners supply their own capital endowments (one unit per capita) and instead they hold equal amount of stocks of all firms in the world so that they share and equally split total profits of all firms in the world. The half of total capital rewards from all firms in the North belongs to northern capital owners and the rest belongs to southern owners, and vice versa. As a result of the portfolio assumption, the capital owners’ rewards in each

---

\(^6\) A typical first order condition is $p(1-1/\sigma) = wa$; rearranging, the operating profit, $(p-w)a)c$, equals $pc/\sigma$. 
nation are independent of firm location. For simplicity’s sake, $E^w$ can be normalised to one by assuming $L^w = 1 - \mu$: $E^w = \frac{L^w}{1 - \mu}$

### 2.3. Firm heterogeneity and export fixed costs

Then, we add firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) to the FCVL model in the manner of Baldwin and Okubo (2006a) (2006b). Here, our model assumes away free entry and exit of Melitz (2003), instead of allowing for firm relocation (international capital movement). This framework stems from the finding of Baldwin and Okubo (2006b) that firm free relocation and free entry/exit are not compatible in specifying equilibrium solution. Therefore, without free entry and exit, we employ marginal costs difference across firms and one type of beachhead cost, i.e. export fixed costs.

Due to no free entry and exit, the mass of varieties, $n$ and $n^*=0.5$, continues to be determined by endowments as usual in the FCVL model, allowing firms to have different $a$’s and thus different marginal production costs. Since each firm is associated with a particular unit of capital, it is natural to assign the source of heterogeneity to capital, i.e. each unit of capital in each nation is associated with a particular level of marginal cost as measured by the unit labour requirement, ‘$a$’. The ‘$a$’s are assumed to be distributed by a Pareto probability distribution, whose cumulative density function can be defined as:

\[
G[a] = \left( \frac{a^\rho}{a_0^\rho} \right)^{a_0}, \quad 1 \equiv a_0 \geq a \geq 0, \quad \rho \geq 1
\]

where $\rho$ and $a_0$ respectively stand for the ‘shape’ and ‘scale’ parameters; without loss of generality, we choose units such that $a_0=1$. (See Figure 1)

---

![Figure 1: ‘$a$’ distribution and firm types at initial equilibrium.](image-url)
beachhead costs, we can already anticipate that only firms with sufficiently low marginal costs will enjoy sales that are high enough to justify the market-entry costs. The beachhead cost, $F$, creates one cut-off level for marginal costs, labelled $a_X$ (Figure 1). The export fixed costs involve labour with its equal units in the origin and destination country to keep symmetry of income and factor endowments.\(^7\) Firms that have $a_Y$’s above $a_X$ will not find it worthwhile to sell in their export market. Under regularity conditions discussed below, the cut-off point splits two types of firms: D firms that produce and sell only locally (D-types, short for domestic firms), firms that sell locally and also export (X-types, short for export firms).

### 2.4. Initial symmetric equilibrium

We start with the symmetric equilibrium in autarchy and then reduce trade costs gradually. The producer price index $P_p$ and the consumer price index $p$ are identical due to $w=1$. $\frac{\Delta}{\phi}$ is a mnemonic for denominator and it is related to the CES price index $P\equiv P_p = \frac{\Delta}{\phi} = (\Delta)^{\mu(1-\sigma)}(1-1/\sigma)$. Here, $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$ at the initial symmetric equilibrium ($se = 0.5$), proportional to the denominator of a standard CES demand function, can be defined as:

\[
\Delta = n\Delta^* \int_0^{a_X} a^{1-\sigma} dG(a) + n^* \phi \Delta^* \int_0^{a_X} a^{1-\sigma} dG(a)
\]

where $n=n^* = 0.5$ and * denotes the South. Note that these equations are recursive in $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$.

### 2.5. Location choice and order of delocation

Each firm can choose its location in search of the highest pure-profit, i.e. capital rewards. Since firm productivities are heterogeneous, the location decisions are idiosyncratic across firms. The pure profits by X type and D type firms in each country can be written as

\[
\pi_X[a] = bB a^{1-\sigma} - F \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_X^*[a] = bB^* a^{1-\sigma} - F
\]

where $B = \frac{\Delta^*}{\phi} \left( \frac{S_E}{\Delta} + \frac{1-S_E}{\Delta^*} \right)$, $B^* = \frac{\Delta^*}{\phi} \left( \frac{S_E}{\Delta} + \frac{1-S_E}{\Delta^*} \right)$ and $s_E = \frac{E}{E^*}$.

\[
\pi_D[a] = bB_D a^{1-\sigma} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_D^*[a] = bB^*_D a^{1-\sigma}
\]

where $B_D = \frac{S_E}{\Delta}$, $B^*_D = \frac{1-S_E}{\Delta^*}$ and $s_E = \frac{E}{E^*}$.

Profits are functions of the expenditure ratio, $s_E$, and the marginal costs, $a$. Small marginal costs (small ‘$a$’s) types, i.e. high productivity firms, can make more pure profits.

### Cut-off conditions

A firm exports only if its operating profit exceeds a given level of the beachhead cost, $F$. The cut-off levels of marginal cost $a_X$ in Figure 1 are determined by:

\[
\phi a_X^{1-\sigma} \frac{1-S_E}{\Delta} = f ; \quad \phi a_X^{1-\sigma} \frac{S_E}{\Delta} = f \quad ; \quad f = \frac{F}{b}
\]

where $a_X^*$ and $a_X$ are the cut-off marginal costs for entering export markets, respectively, $s_E$ (or $(1-s_E)$) is expenditure in the North (or South). As Baldwin and Okubo (2006b) studied, free

\(^7\) The income from export fixed costs is equal between nations even if all firms concentrate in one nation.
delocation leads to identical cut-off levels, \( a_X^* = a_X \), despite of the market size difference between the two nations. Likewise, free delocation in our model equalises the cut-off levels, i.e. \( a_X = a_X^* \).

**Two phases of migration process, XX and DD**

At an initial symmetric equilibrium, profits should be equal between the two nations regardless of productivity differences, caused by the symmetric size of demand \((s_E = 0.5)\), the equal size of factor endowments (labour and capital) and the symmetry in firm distribution, bringing about the identical value of the \( \Delta \)s, equation (7). However, the symmetric equilibrium is not always stable. This is the same conjecture as in the standard NEG model. Below a critical level of trade costs (above the break point in freeness of trade), once a single firm migrates from one to the other nation (from the South to the North in this paper for convenience), the profit gap, \( \pi[a] - \pi^*[a] \), becomes positive.\(^8\) When a single firm deviates from the South to the North, the gap in pure profits of the deviated firm, \( \alpha_R \), is represented as the function of each firm’s productivity and its type (‘R’ is mnemonic for relocation):

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_X[\alpha_R] = \pi_X^*[\alpha_R] &= b(B - B^*)\alpha_R^{1-\sigma} \geq 0; \quad 0 \leq \alpha_R \leq a_X \quad \text{for X type firms} \\
\pi_D[\alpha_R] = \pi_D^*[\alpha_R] &= b(B_D - B_D^*)\alpha_R^{1-\sigma} \geq 0; \quad a_D \leq \alpha_R \leq 1 \quad \text{for D type firms}
\end{align*}
\]

As in the standard VL models and CP model, the solutions are also analytically unsolvable due to the recursive forms of \( \Delta \) and \( \Delta^* \) in \( B, B^*, B_D \) and \( B_D^* \) as shown below.\(^9\) For this reason, we employ a numerical solution following the standard NEG technique. Figure 2 graphs equation (11) which shows that when trade costs are small enough to induce an unstable symmetric equilibrium, the firms that have the most to gain from relocation are the most efficient firms, thus it is the most efficient firms that will tend to move first. This result is intuitively obvious, since the home market effect (HME) is driven by each firm’s desire to minimise trade costs by locating near the big market and large/efficient firms sell more and thus have more to gain from moving to the marginally big market (the North). Note that by the definition of \( a_X \), firms with \( \alpha_R = a_X \) are just indifferent to exporting so \( v_X[a] \) and \( v_D[a] \) touch at \( a_X \) as shown in Figure 2.

\(^8\) Conversely, even in case of delocation from the North to the South, all of the qualitative results remain the same as shown below in this paper.

\(^9\) (12), (13), (14) and (15) are used for plotting of (11) shown as Figure 2.
**Figure 2: Relocation gains.**

**Result 1:** The symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable at sufficiently low iceberg trade costs; the first firms to move are the efficient export firms. Small local firms have less incentive to move to the other nation and so do not move at first.

When the symmetric equilibrium is unstable due to small trade costs (above the break point in freeness of trade), the most efficient Southern firms have the most to gain from moving and thus move first. The delocation, however, raises the degree of competition in the North while lowering in the South, but additionally raises $s_E$ through the intermediate input linkage in our model, which cannot arise in the FC model of Baldwin and Okubo (2006a) (2006b). Therefore, although the value of $v[a]$ declines as the range of firms that have moved expands, the decline is slower than Baldwin and Okubo (2006a) (2006b) due to intermediate demand shifting towards the North. The process continues until the gain from moving is zero (i.e. firms move until all firms are indifferent to their location, which happens when $v[a_R]=0$).

Inspection of equation (11) reveals that $a_R$ starts out at zero but gets progressively closer to $a_X$ as relocation goes for the small trade costs (above the break point, $\phi_{\text{break}}$). This implies that the migrating firms are initially X-types. Given $\phi$, the production cost linkage through delocation cumulatively pushes firm relocation. $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$ in the XX phase can be written as

$$\Delta = n\Delta^a \int_0^d a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + n^*\phi\Delta^\mu \int_0^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + n^*\Delta^e \int_{a_X}^{\widetilde{a}_R} a^{-\sigma} dG(a)$$

$$\Delta^* = n^*\Delta^\mu \int_{a_X}^{\widetilde{a}_R} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + n^*\phi\Delta^\mu \int_{0}^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + n^*\phi\Delta^\mu \int_{a_X}^{\widetilde{a}_R} a^{-\sigma}$$

Note that both are recursive and thus cannot be solved as before, solving to

$$\Delta = 0.5\lambda \left[ \Delta^\mu (1 + \widetilde{a}_R) + \phi \Delta^\mu (a_X^\sigma - \widetilde{a}_R^\sigma) \right]$$

and

$$\Delta^* = 0.5\lambda \left[ \phi \Delta^\mu (a_X^\sigma + \widetilde{a}_R^\sigma) + \Delta^\mu (1 - \widetilde{a}_R^\sigma) \right]$$

where $\alpha \equiv 1 - \sigma + \rho$ and $\lambda \equiv \rho/(1 - \sigma + \rho)$. Note that $1-\sigma+\rho>0$ is a regularity condition, which ensures the integral convergence.

Using Result 1, the share of expenditure in this phase, $\widetilde{a}_R < a_X$, can be written as
where $b \equiv \mu/\sigma$ and $\bar{a}_R$ refers to the cut-off level of efficiency. The first term is northern workers’ income ratio, the second term represents northern’s intermediate input demand ratio. Note that since we assume that the southern firms with marginal costs from 0 to $\bar{a}_R$ delocate to the North, $s_E > 0.5$ can always arise.

However, when all southern X-types have moved to the North, as seen in Figure 2, the profit gap is still positive, i.e. $v[a_X] > 0$. Accordingly, a second phase of delocation begins in which all the migrating firms are D-types. We refer to these two phases of migration as XX and DD migration.

**Phase 2: DD migration.** After $\bar{a}_R$ equals $a_X$, migration affects the $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$ differently because the South no longer exports manufactures to the North and the migrating firms no longer sell back into the southern market. Now the $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$ can be expressed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta &= n\Delta^\sigma \int_0^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + n^*\Delta^\sigma \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) \\
\Delta^* &= n^*\Delta^\sigma \int_0^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a) + (n + n^*)\phi \Delta^\sigma \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} a^{-\sigma} dG(a)
\end{align*}
\]

which solve to $\Delta = 0.5\lambda\Delta^\sigma (1 + \bar{a}_R^\sigma)$ and $\Delta^* = 0.5\lambda \left[ \Delta^\sigma (1 - \bar{a}_R^\sigma) + 2\phi \Delta^\sigma \bar{a}_X^\sigma \right]$. The share of expenditure can be given as,

\[
\begin{align*}
s_E &= \frac{1 - \mu + b}{2} \left( \sigma - 1 \right) \left( n \int_0^{\bar{a}_R} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n^* \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n \int_0^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n^* \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) \right) \\
&= \frac{\sigma - 1}{2} \left( n \int_0^{\bar{a}_R} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n^* \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n \int_0^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) + n^* \int_{\bar{a}_R}^{a_X} Bd \sigma^\sigma dG(a) \right)
\end{align*}
\]

As shown in Figure 2, relocation continues to raise $\bar{a}_R$ gradually up to $BD = Bd^*$, in which the equilibrium relocation cut-off is determined as $\bar{a}_R^*$.

Note that the slope of XX diagram is flatter than the DD diagram and never cut the horizontal axis, $v[a] > 0$ for any $a$’s. The steeper slope of DD phase implies that relocated D type firms cannot sell to the original market, and thus are much more sensitive to the market size and its market crowding effect at their new location than for X-type firms. By contrast, since relocated X firms can sell to their original market, this mitigates the market crowding effect at their new location. Thus, since the forward and backward linkages are always stronger than the market crowding effect for X types, the decline of the gain from relocation is slower than for D type firms. This leads all X-type firms to move to one nation or the other above the break point.

Compared to Baldwin and Okubo (2006b), the XX phase looks flatter. The intermediate input linkage increases ‘$s_E$’ through firm delocation. This relatively increased market size makes the decline of $v[a]$ slower in terms of ‘a’ through delocation and thus more southern firms can move to the North. If $\mu$ is close to 0 and intermediate input linkages becomes weaker, the XX phase shifts down and has a steeper slope, and closer to the one in Baldwin and Okubo’s
heterogeneous-firms FC model. While the relocation cut-off $a_R$ in our model is always in the DD phase, the cutoff level in the FC model with firm heterogeneity of Baldwin and Okubo (2006b) can be either D type or X type firms in phase two relocation. Since the FC model has neither demand-linked nor cost-linked circular causality, agglomeration forces are weaker compared to our model and thus their model has an equilibrium in the XX phase as well as in the DD phase. To summarise:

**Result 2:** (Two phases of firm delocation). Once trade costs are small (above the break point in freeness of trade), the relocation starts: the subsequent delocation process is marked by two phases. Migration of Southern X-types takes place first. In the second phase, which starts once all X-type firms have left the small region, migration consists of Southern D-type firms that remain D-types in their new location. The cost linkage through intermediate inputs can promote firm relocation in our model as it causes the North to attract more firms. As a consequence, the equilibrium cut-off level, $a_R$, is always determined in the second relocation phase (DD phase).

### 3. The Impact of Firm Heterogeneity on the Location Equilibrium in the Simplest Model

To analyse the impact of firm heterogeneity *per se* on the VL model equilibrium features, we first simplify the model, excluding export fixed costs ($F=0$), so that we have no D-type firms ($a_X=1$). All heterogeneous firms are X types. The equilibrium is determined by profit equalisation. This simplification characterises only the XX phase in Figure 2. Due to $v_X[a]>0$ for all a, once trade freeness is above the break point, all firms instantaneously move resulting in catastrophic agglomeration. Since the equilibrium path cannot be solved analytically as in the standard NEG models, this section diagrammatically shows the equilibrium using the Tomahawk Diagram and the Wiggle Diagram, following the standard NEG’s numerical simulation approach.

#### 3.1. The Wiggle Diagram

First, this section provides a viewpoint to evaluate the local stability of equilibria diagrammatically using a “wiggle diagram” as in the earliest CP model analysis. Using (8) subject to (12) and (13) and given $a_X=1$, our wiggle diagram depicts $B-B^*$ in terms of $s_P$ as Figure 3. The diagram shows an upward slope for low trade costs while it is downward sloping for high trade costs. This suggests that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for high trade costs but low trade costs make the symmetric equilibrium unstable and the core-periphery equilibrium stable. With intermediate trade costs, the two asymmetric equilibria are unstable and the symmetric and core-periphery equilibrium are both stable. These findings are the same as in the CP, VL and FCVL models in the absence of firm heterogeneity.

---

10 Note that $\mu$ should be still kept as positive: $\mu=0$ means not only no manufacturing intermediate input demand but also no consumption of the M goods as final goods, and thus the discussion would be invalid.

11 At $B=B^*$, all firms are indifferent in location between the two nations, which is an equilibrium.
3.2. The Tomahawk Diagram

Next, the equilibria are summarized with a so-called “tomahawk diagram”, plotting with respect to the share of the number of firms, $s_n$, as well as production shares, $s_P$.

The relationship between $s_n$ and $\phi$ for each equilibrium point is plotted in Figure 4. The sustain and break points are not affected by firm heterogeneity. Firm heterogeneity only influences the asymmetric unstable equilibria. Firm heterogeneity works as a dispersion force. That is, as firms are more heterogeneous (smaller $\rho$), the delocation process diminishes the agglomeration in terms of firm shares in asymmetric equilibria. Intuitively, the most efficient firms have the largest incentive to locate in the larger market, because they have the highest sales and intend to save trade costs, as seen in the last section. But on the other hand, the delocation of the most efficient firms (i.e. the largest-production firms) causes more intense local competition in the large market, resulting in lowering the number of delocated firms.
Now, in terms of production shares, $s_P$, firm heterogeneity never affects any of the equilibrium features (Figure 5). Heterogeneity never plays the role of a dispersion force even for asymmetric equilibria in production shares, in which the number of delocated efficient firms is limited to keep the production shares at a certain constant level. With respect to firm distribution, the increased firm heterogeneity (smaller $\rho$) relatively raises the number of high-productivity firms that can produce more, and thus fewer firms delocate so as to compensate the constant production shares. Accordingly, this keeps the total production level in each market constant. What this means is that the production share is independent of firm heterogeneity.

**Result 3:** Firm heterogeneity never affects break points and sustain points. Firm heterogeneity affects asymmetric equilibria in firm shares, and weakens the delocation process as dispersion force. With respect to production shares, however, firm heterogeneity has no influence on the delocation process even in asymmetric equilibria.
3.3. **Equilibrium features in non-export fixed cost model**

As in the standard FCVL model, since firms buy their intermediate inputs, they care about the local cost of production, i.e. the price index and $\Delta$. Thus, firm relocation is determined by the reward to production as shown in (8). Cost linkage plays a crucial role via production-cost linkage in this model. Therefore, we can say that the cost-linked circular causality operates (circular causality).

Then, to confirm the result that firm heterogeneity never influences break and sustain points, analytical solutions are provided. Differentiating $B-B^*$ with respect to $\tilde{a}_R$ around $\tilde{a}_R = 0$ using (8), (12) and (13) (given $a_X = 1$), the break point can be derived as

$$\phi^{\text{Break}} = \frac{(1-\mu)(1-\mu+b)}{(1+\mu)(1+\mu-b)}.$$

The sustain point is found to satisfy the following equation:

$$1 - (\phi^{\text{sustain}})^{\mu-1} (1 - s + (\phi^{\text{sustain}})^2 s) = 0; \quad s = \frac{1+\mu-b}{2}.$$

These points correspond to those of the homogeneous models (FCVL and VL models). In other words, we claim that both points are not a function of firm heterogeneity, $\rho$ and thus we can confirm the previously shown result: Firm heterogeneity does not affect the sustain and break points (neutrality of firm heterogeneity). Due to $0 < \phi^{\text{sustain}} < \phi^{\text{Break}} < 1$, the stable equilibria overlap, and thus shocks to expectations may result in a large spatial reallocation with either symmetric or full agglomeration (the overlap and self-fulfilling expectations). Moreover, sudden and massive agglomeration could occur as a response to a small reduction in trade costs from $\phi^{\text{Break}}$. This is called catastrophic agglomeration. Overall, trade costs reductions lead to full agglomeration. Also, partial agglomeration is never a stable equilibrium, in which the location of industry is either symmetric or all firms concentrate in one nation or the other (endogenous asymmetry).

Starting from a core-periphery situation, firms are not indifferent to their location. Clearly, the core-periphery outcome can be measured by the agglomeration rents, i.e. the loss incurred by the relocation from the core to the periphery, which are a function of $\phi$:

$$\frac{b}{\lambda} (1-\phi^{\mu-1} (1 - s + (\phi^{2} s)) a^{1-\sigma}; \quad s = \frac{1+\mu-b}{2}.$$ 

which is parallel to the ones in the standard NEG models (Baldwin et al. 2003). Accordingly, the agglomeration rent curve (the agglomeration rents in terms of $\phi$) looks hump shaped. This means that as trade gets freer, the agglomeration rent curve first rises and then falls.

**Result 4:** In the absence of export-fixed costs, where all firms are exporting, firm heterogeneity never affects the sustain and break points. Firm heterogeneity *per se* has no impact on the equilibrium features: circular causality, endogenous asymmetry, catastrophic agglomeration, the overlap and self-fulfilling expectations and hump-shaped agglomeration rent curve.

---

12 See Appendix 1 for the derivation.
13 Although we cannot derive an analytical solution for the sustain point, this equation can be derived by $\pi[a]-\pi^*[a]=b(B-B^*) a^{1-\sigma}=0$ with full agglomeration. Since all firms locate in the North (core), the total income in the core (North) is given by $(1-\mu+b)/2$ and the intermediate input demand is $(1-\sigma)b$. Thus, $s$ in $B$ and $B^*$ can be given as $s=(1+\mu-b)/2$. Also $\Delta$ and $\Delta^*$ in $B$ and $B^*$ can be given as $\Delta = \lambda^{(1-\mu)}$ and $\Delta^* = \phi^2 a^{(1-\mu)}$.
14 See Appendix 2 for the derivation. See Baldwin et al. (2003) about agglomeration rent curves for detail.
4. THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE GENERAL MODEL

This section turns to the general model with full features by reintroducing the assumption of export fixed costs ($F > 0$) and explores the resulting equilibria starting with the symmetric equilibrium. As discussed in Section 2, the efficient firms are X types, while the inefficient firms are D types. Importantly, since firm productivity is dissimilar, the location decisions are firm-dependent. The order of delocation is first the X types, and after all X types have moved to the other country, the D types start to move in order of their efficiency. This relocation process continues until the gain from relocation is zero. As seen in Figure 2, the XX phase is always positive. Thus, we always have the locational equilibrium in the DD phase rather than in the XX phase, i.e. $BD = BD^*$: All X type firms and some D type firms locate in the core and some D firms remain in the periphery. Hence, the firms at the cut-off level of relocation $a_R$ are D type, which means that the relocation cut-off level is always larger than that of the export market, i.e. $a_R > a_X$ (Result 2).

4.1. The Wiggle Diagram

In Figure 6, $B-B^*$ for the XX phase and $B_D-B_D^*$ for the DD phase are plotted in terms of $s_P$ using (8), (12) and (13), and (9), (14) and (15) respectively. Different from the non-export fixed costs model is the presence of the DD-phase. After all X-firms move to the other country, the diagram curve switches from the XX phase to the DD phase. With high trade costs, given the level of $F$, the diagram of both XX and DD phases is downward sloped ($s_P = 0.5$ is stable) (see top panel of Figure 6). Since DD is downward sloped, the diagram is overall downward sloped with only one stable symmetric equilibrium. Secondly, with intermediate trade costs above the break point ($\phi > \phi_{\text{break}}$), the XX phase is upward sloped but the DD phase is downward sloped (middle of Figure 6). Since the symmetric equilibrium is unstable, firms move to the other country, but after all X-type firms have moved, the D types start to move as well. But the D type delocation reduces southern competition and causes congestion in the North such that the delocation process stops. Partial agglomeration emerges. As trade costs fall, the DD phase is still downward sloped but steadily shifts up for any $s_P > 0.5$: 1) The increased number of X-type firms increases the intermediate input demand ratio for export production in relatively large North (increased $s_E$), and in addition 2) lower trade costs decrease the import prices in the smaller South (increased $\Delta^*$). These two changes shift up $B_D-B_D^*$ as trade costs reduce. Finally, for still lower trade costs, the downward-sloped DD curve reaches a positive value at $s_P = 1$, and thus full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium, involving positive agglomeration rents (bottom of Figure 6).

---

15 Note that all X firms are in the bigger North in the DD phase. Only the North exports M goods.
High trade costs

Intermediate trade costs
Importantly, the DD phase is everywhere downward sloped for any $s_p > 0.5$. As D firms move to the North, their varieties unavailable in the South increase, and thus some of the varieties consumed in the South (as final goods and as intermediate inputs) are lost and thus drastically reduces $\Delta^*$ and increases $\Delta$. This boosts the market crowding effect in the core. Since D-type firms cannot export to the other country, their gain from locating in the core highly depends on competition in their own country. For this reason, the market crowding effect for D-type firms is much more severe than for X-type firms, works as a strong dispersion force and reduces their gain from locating in the core as firm relocation proceeds. What this means is that the firms deviate from the symmetric equilibrium above break point trade costs, but when all X-type moves to the North and some high productivity D-type firms move and some other low productivity D-type firms remain in the South, we can reach a stable asymmetric equilibrium. In other words, gradual agglomeration occurs without catastrophic asymmetric equilibrium while trade costs are reduced.

4.2. **The Tomahawk Diagram**

Summarising the equilibrium, as seen in Figure 7, the Tomahawk Diagram looks like a pitchfork rather than a tomahawk, in which the symmetric equilibrium turns from stable to unstable and asymmetric equilibria become stable before the they reach the core-periphery outcome: there is no overlap between break and sustain points and gradual agglomeration occurs as trade gets freer.

Nevertheless, the above contrasts sharply with the standard NEG models results. In the standard CP and VL models (and also all kinds of VL models including FCVL) as well as our non-export-fixed cost-heterogeneous firms model in Section 3, the tomahawk diagram can be always obtained but never displays gradual agglomeration and the pitchfork diagram.
The reason for the contrasting outcomes in our model comes from the fact that the D-type firms introduced by the export fixed costs cannot export to the other market. The delocated D-type firms cannot sell back to their original market. The smaller availability of varieties reduces intermediate inputs access, which weakens backward and forward linkages as agglomeration force for X and D-types firms, compared with the standard models. The market crowding effect for D-type firms is stronger than for X-type firms: X-type firms’ market share in the larger North decreases, but they can compensate the loss in the northern share through exporting and expanding market share in the smaller South. By contrast, D-type firms cannot benefit from this kind of compensation by export sales. This strong market crowding effect for D-type firms works as a much stronger dispersion force. Furthermore, the impossibility of exporting for D-type firms leads to a reduction in the availability of import varieties in both nations, decreasing backward/forward linkages. Therefore, in the vertical linkage model with firm heterogeneity in the presence of export fixed costs, the presence of D-type firms weakens agglomeration forces for all firms and strengthens the dispersion force for D-type firms, resulting in gradual agglomeration.

**Result 5:** In the presence of positive export fixed costs, gradual agglomeration occurs above the break point and catastrophic agglomeration never happens. The diagram looks like a pitchfork in terms of freeness trade.

**Result 6:** The impossibility of exporting by the D-type local firms reduces their agglomeration forces and increases their dispersion force. This leads to gradual agglomeration.

Moreover, there is the possibility of non-full agglomeration, in which full agglomeration never occurs even at $\phi=1$ and an asymmetric equilibrium ($0 < s_P < 1$) is stable. Full agglomeration never happens if
(19) \[ \left( \frac{\lambda f}{1-s} \right)^{\alpha(1-\mu)/\rho} - \frac{s}{1-s} > 0; \quad s = \frac{1 + \mu - b}{2} \] (Non-full agglomeration condition)

Sufficiently high export fixed costs and firm heterogeneity (larger \( \lambda \), i.e. smaller \( \rho \)) are likely to cause non-full agglomeration. Intuitively, since most firms are D-type and a few firms are X-type due to sufficiently large \( F \) or small \( \rho \), firm relocation immediately involves DD phase relocation. But this phase faces a strong market crowding effect and relocation stops at partial agglomeration.

Result 7: (Non-full agglomeration possibility) Sufficiently large export fixed costs or higher degree of firm heterogeneity makes non-full agglomeration likelier. In other words, firm heterogeneity works as a dispersion force and as a result full agglomeration is less likely to occur.

4.3. Discussion of the equilibrium

Circular Causality and Endogenous Asymmetry

As in the non-export fixed costs model, there exists cost linked circular causality because the firms buy their intermediate goods. But the demand linkage and cost linkage are weaker than in the non-export fixed cost model and other NEG models because of fewer varieties of intermediate inputs due to unavailability of D-type firms’ varieties in the foreign market. Furthermore, the market crowding effects are different between firm types; in particular the effect for D-firms is more severe than for X-types due to the absence of sales in the foreign market.

A gradual trade costs reduction eventually leads to full or partial agglomeration as a stable equilibrium. Different from the other NEG models, the equilibrium path looks like a pitchfork. Thus, trade costs reduction starting from a high level in a perfectly symmetric equilibrium eventually leads to full agglomeration (endogenous asymmetry). But, it might not involve all firms in one nation or the other. There is the possibility of non-full agglomeration, i.e. of a non core-periphery structure (Result 7).

Non-catastrophic Agglomeration and no-overlapping and self-fulfilling expectations

While the sustain point was not analytically solvable as reduced form in the standard VL model and our non-export fixed costs model, in this model, solving \( B_D - B'_D = 0 \) at full agglomeration with respect to \( \phi \), it can be explicitly written as

\[ \phi_{\text{Sustain}} = \left( \frac{1-s}{s} \right)^{1/\mu} \frac{1}{a_X}; \quad a_X = \left( \frac{1-s}{\lambda f} \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad s = \frac{1 + \mu - b}{2} \]

Note that \( a_X \) at full agglomeration is determined by the export cut-off conditions (10), independent of \( \phi \). \(^{17}\)

\(^{16}\) Solving \( B_D - B'_D = 0 \), where \( \Delta = \lambda^{1/(1-\mu)} \), \( \Delta^* = \lambda^* \phi^* a_X^* = \lambda^{1/(1-\mu)} \phi a_X^* \), and \( s = (1 + \mu - b)/2 \), we can get \( s -(1-s)/((\phi)^{1-\mu} a_X^{(1-\mu)}) \).

\(^{17}\) From the export cut-off condition, \( \phi a_X^{1-\sigma} \lambda^{\mu/(1-\mu)} (1-s)/\lambda^{(1/(1-\mu))} \phi a_X^* = f \Rightarrow \frac{1-s}{\lambda a_X^*} = f \). Note that \( a_X \) is independent of \( \phi \). If \( a_X \) is considered to be 1 due to \( F=0 \) and sales and profits from the foreign market are added in the formulation of \( BD \), i.e. transformed to a \( B \) function, the sustain point converges to the one in the non-export fixed cost case.
However, the break point is intractable due to the complexity of a marginal shift of $a_X$ in response to marginal firms deviating from the symmetric equilibrium. Thus, attempting to enable a good comparison with the non-export fixed costs model, the break point is approximately derived by assuming a fixed $a_X$ (assuming no response from the change of $a_R$).

In sum, the approximate break point, $\tilde{\phi^{\text{Break}}}$, regardless of the non-reduced form, can be expressed as

$$\tilde{\phi^{\text{Break}}} = \frac{(1-\mu)(1-\mu+b)}{(1+\mu)(1+(\mu-b)a_X^\alpha)}.$$  

(21)

The approximate break point is always larger than in the non-export fixed costs (16) because of $0 < a_X < 1$ (decreased $a_X$ increases $\tilde{\phi^{\text{Break}}}$). Accordingly, $\tilde{\phi^{\text{Break}}}$ is larger than the break points in the standard CP and VL model.

Next, to rigorously check the non-overlapping of the sustain $\phi^{\text{sustain}}$ and ‘exact’ break point $\phi^{\text{Break}}$ (assuming away no response of $a_X$ through delocation), Figure 8 plots the sustain and ‘exact’ break points in terms of $F$ using a numerical simulation technique. The minimum effective level, $F_{\text{min}}$, represents the fact that the least efficient firms are D-type firms19 (our discussion pertains to the right hand side of $F_{\text{min}}$). The figure illustrates no overlap, i.e. $\phi^{\text{Break}} < \phi^{\text{sustain}}$, which parallels the diagrammatic outcomes from the Wiggle diagram. The sustain point increases as $F$ rises, which indicates that for larger $F$ full agglomeration is less likely to occur (Result 7). The expansion of the gradual (partial) agglomeration range indicates that for higher export fixed costs gradual agglomeration is more likely to occur.

\[ F_{\text{min}} = b\lambda \frac{1-\mu+b}{2}. \]

18 See Appendix 1 for derivation.

19 $F_{\text{min}}$ is the condition for at least one D type firm operating at full agglomeration. The export cut-off condition can be written as $F = ba_X^{\alpha-\sigma} \Delta^{\alpha-1} (1-s)$ . Due to $\Delta^{\alpha-\mu} \leq \lambda$ and $a_X < 1$, we can derive the condition: $F_{\text{min}} \equiv b\lambda \frac{1-\mu+b}{2}$. 

---

Figure 8: The sustain/break points and export fixed costs.
In sum, since the model does not have the overlapping range between break and sustain points, the model does not feature catastrophic agglomeration by marginal trade costs reduction from the break point. Due to the presence of D-type firms, gradual agglomeration occurs. That is to say, there is no possibility of a large sudden spatial reallocation involving full agglomeration caused by shocks to expectations (neither overlap nor self-fulfilling expectation). To summarise,

**Result 8:** No overlap between the break and sustain points implies neither catastrophic agglomeration nor self-fulfilling expectation.

While this finding of gradual agglomeration stands entirely in contrast to the widely spread findings of the existing NEG theories, empirical studies could be argued to support our findings (Davis and Weinstein, 2002 and 2004).20

**Agglomeration Rents**

Different from the non-export fixed costs model and the standard NEG models, agglomeration rent curves are for D-type firms, because the least efficient D-type firms move to periphery first. That is, the agglomeration rents for D-type firms are given by

\[
\frac{b}{\lambda} \left( s - \frac{1-s}{\phi^{1-\mu}} \left( (1-s)/\lambda f \right)^{(1-\mu)/\lambda} \right) a^{1-\sigma}
\]

which is increasing in \( \phi \). The agglomeration rent curve is monotonically positively sloped (Figure 9). Specifically, agglomeration rents at free trade, \( \phi=1 \), are represented by

\[
\frac{b}{\lambda} \left( s - \frac{1-s}{\lambda f} \right) a^{1-\sigma}. \tag{21}
\]

![Figure 9: Agglomeration rent curves.](image)

Positive agglomeration rents lead to full agglomeration at a certain level of the sustain point, and on the other hand full agglomeration never occurs with negative agglomeration rents. A

20 Davis and Weinstein (2004) did not find any empirical evidences to verify the existence of the overlap of multiple stable equilibria as the standard NEG suggested, looking at Japanese cities and manufacturing.

21 When this is negative, non-full agglomeration condition can be derived as (19).
positive agglomeration rent of D-type firms means that all firms including all D-type firms strictly prefer to locate in the core even at free trade. In marked contrast to the indifference to location in the standard NEG literature, zero-trade costs in our model cannot perfectly eliminate the home market effect (HME) pressure; locational preference for the larger market remains. This is because D-type firms cannot export to the other country irrespective of trade liberalisation and thus the determinants of their location at free trade are market size, in particular with regard to intermediate input varieties. Free trade with small $F$ allows for many $X$ firms, exporting costlessly to the periphery, reducing the difference in the market crowding effect between the two nations. On the other hand, forward and backward linkages in the North are stronger than in the South because of the presence of all D-type firms in the North at full agglomeration. For this reason, all firms prefer the core even at free trade.\(^{22}\)

**Result 9:** In the presence of export fixed costs, the agglomeration rent curve is upward sloped with respect of $\phi$. Even at free trade, agglomeration rents could be positive. Free trade never equalises firm location preference between core and periphery.

### 5. Inequality--Trade and TBTs Liberalisation

#### 5.1. **TBTs liberalisation and export fixed costs**

Trade liberalisation has long focussed on lowering trade costs, but many kinds of trade barriers still remain in place among the developed countries, related to market-specific regulations and policies. These kinds of barriers can be called technical barriers to trade (TBTs), currently discussed in the WTO. In our model, $F$ can be interpreted as foreign market specific costs to deal with different regulation and market policies. Then, the reduced $F$ as a result of the TBTs liberalisation allows more D-type firms to enter the export market, promoting demand and cost linkages due a larger availability of foreign varieties. As seen in Figure 8, while both sustain and break points decrease in TBTs liberalisation (decreased $F$), the range of gradual agglomeration, i.e. between $\phi_{sustain}$ and $\phi_{break}$, reduces. Full agglomeration is more likely to occur.

**Result 10:** TBTs liberalisation promotes the agglomeration process, decreasing the break and sustain points and reducing the gradual (partial) agglomeration range.

#### 5.2. **Inequality of nations**

Now, turning to the discussion of Krugman and Venables (1995) that there is convergence of real incomes and welfare between core and periphery at free trade, this part studies whether trade and TBTs liberalisation lead to the convergence of welfare in the core-periphery structure.\(^{23}\) The total utility of each nation (real income) is given by $V = \frac{Y}{P^\mu} = \frac{Y}{\Delta^{\mu(1-\sigma)}}$ in the North (core) and $V^* = \frac{Y^*}{P^{*\mu}} = \frac{Y^*}{\Delta^{*\mu(1-\sigma)}}$ in the South (periphery), where $Y$ is total workers’ and capital owners’ income in each nation, and $Y^*=Y^*=(1-\mu+b)/2$ due to symmetric endowments.\(^{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Note that the agglomeration rents could be negative for any $\phi$ in case of extremely large $F$ (the non-full agglomeration case).

\(^{23}\) Our discussion in this part is in the full agglomeration case for simplicity’s sake. In this part, trade liberalisation is to gradually reduce trade costs from the sustain point and TBTs liberalisation is to reduce $F$ up to $F_{min}$ (at least the least efficient firms are D-types), where reduction of $F$ is starting from a moderate level so as to exclude the non-full agglomeration case.

\(^{24}\) Note that two symmetric initial endowments and capital owners’ portfolio keep each nation’s total nominal income constant.
Since all D-type and X-type firms are in the North and have no incentive to deviate above the sustain point, Y and ∆ are not affected by trade (increased φ) and TBTs (decreased F) liberalisation. On the other hand, trade liberalisation directly increases ∆ (= λφΔaX) without changing aX in Δ *, while TBTs liberalisation (the fall of F), ceteris paribus, increases Δ* by increasing aX, namely expanding the consumed varieties in the periphery. This is because aX, determined by the cut-off point condition, \( \frac{1-s_F}{\lambda^2 a_q^e} = F/b \), is independent of φ but decreasing in F (See Footnote 17). As a consequence, V* increases in trade/TBTs liberalisation, keeping V constant.

However, both types of liberalisation never produce convergence in both nations’ welfares due to the absence of local core producers’ varieties in the consumption in the periphery. As long as there exists D type (aX<1), Δ * never equals to Δ even at free trade(φ=1) or at F=Fmin. This implies that the small country would have a negative attitude towards trade liberalisation as well as TBTs liberalisation due to the divergence of welfare. These outcomes are entirely different from Krugman and Venables’s outcomes. Our outcomes might shed some light on the current difficulties in liberalisation process.

**Result 11:** Trade and TBTs liberalisation never equalise welfares between core and periphery. The core gains, but the periphery loses.

Peripheral nations are likely to object to trade and TBTs liberalisation. Importantly, this result tells us how important it is that the economy should take a core position and create agglomeration. Different from Krugman and Venables (1995), the economies involved in trade liberalisation never converge with regard to their welfare level once trade costs reach the break point and gradual agglomeration occurs. Thus, it is more crucial and important for nations to induce full agglomeration and become an agglomerated area. The subsidy and other kinds of policies aiming at attracting more firms at an initial stage (symmetric equilibrium at high trade costs) crucially affect the future core-periphery structure. Consequently, these government policies might be much more important than we have predicted from the existing NEG models.

### 5.3. Inequality within a nation

Finally, drawing attention to the heterogeneous firms behaviours within the core (North), we discuss the impact of trade and TBTs liberalisation on firms’ profits in the North in the core-periphery structure. As seen in the left panel of Figure 10, showing the plotted profit in the core in terms of a, trade liberalisation boosts exporters’ profits without altering D-firms’ profits (no profit reallocation effect but a profit expansion effect) because of an absence of impact of φ on Δ in Bo due to no northern imports, and without allowing the most efficient D-firms to enter the export market (no selection effect) due to aX’s independence of φ (Footnote 17). The benefit of trade liberalisation only accrues to exporters with remaining local producers at the same level of profits. This is a different result from Melitz (2003), which features a reallocation effect and selection effect through entry and exit. On the other hand, TBTs liberalisation (fixed φ) has selection effect. As seen in the right panel of Figure 10, the fall of F due to the liberalisation increases aX and allows the most efficient local firms to enter the export market. Their profits increase due to exporting. But the increased number of exporters reduces per firm profit coming from export market. Accordingly, each exporter’s profit diminishes. This implies that TBTs liberalisation has a profit redistribution effect.
Result 12: The benefit of trade liberalisation is allocated only to existing exporters without allowing the local firms to enter the export market. On the contrary, TBTs liberalisation allows more of them to export, associated with a reduction of each existing exporter’s profit.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper studies the impact of trade liberalisation on firm location in a heterogeneous-firm economic geography model with intermediate inputs linkage. In the absence of export fixed costs, firm heterogeneity dampens firms’ shares in asymmetric unstable equilibria but has no impact on the other equilibrium properties. By contrast, in the presence of export fixed costs, firm heterogeneity definitely dampens the agglomeration process. Rather than catastrophic agglomeration, we find gradual agglomeration and the possibility of a non-full agglomeration outcome. Furthermore, trade and TBTs liberalisations never produce a perfect convergence in welfare between core and periphery and even at free trade both economies never converge. The periphery suffers the loss from liberalisation. This implies that policies for attracting firms and creating agglomeration in the early stage of the liberalisation process are much more crucial and important for the future path than in the standard NEG models.

This paper finds the possibility of inequality in welfare across nations and in profits across firms as a consequence of trade and TBTs liberalisation. The current situation of poor countries remaining poor without fully benefiting from globalisation might be reflected by the non-convergence outcome discussed in our paper. It is worthwhile to state that this outcome in welfare implies that there is still room for intervention by governments’ policies to re-allocate firms across nations associated with trade and TBTs liberalisation. It might be possible to say that the currently observed highly concentrated industrial agglomeration in some specific nations in the EU, offshoring in North America, delocation in Europe and hollowing-out in Japan would be in scope of coordination in industrial allocation by inter-governmental policies. With respect to developing nations, the development policies in the early stage might be much more crucial to the future firm allocation and differences in welfare than we have thought. This paper implies that it is necessary to coordinate developing countries’ interests before their trade
liberalisation. But the way by which coordination should take place remains for future research. It would be necessary to extend to the framework to multi-countries and sectors.

REFERENCES


**APPENDIX 1. THE BREAK POINTS**

Here, we show the ‘exact’ break point. The symmetric equilibrium becomes unstable above the break point. As shown in the Wiggle diagram, the symmetric equilibrium is locally unstable if the slope of B-B is positive at \( s_p = 0.5 \). Because of the symmetry of the model, we derive the break point by differentiating \( B-B^* \) given as (8), (10), (12) and (13) at the symmetric equilibrium gives,

\[
\begin{align*}
(23) & \quad \left( 1 - \frac{\mu(1 + a_R^2 - \phi(a_X^2 - a_R^2))}{1 + \phi a_X^2} \right) \frac{d\Delta}{\Delta} - \frac{(1-\phi)\alpha a_X^{a-1}}{1 + \phi a_X^2} da_X - \frac{\phi a_X^{a-1}}{1 + \phi a_X^2} da_X = 0 \\
(24) & \quad \frac{a_X (1 + \mu)}{\Delta} d\Delta + 2a_X ds + (1-\sigma)da_X = 0 \\
(25) & \quad -d\pi + 2s \left( \mu - \frac{1-\phi}{1+\phi} \right) \frac{d\Delta}{\Delta} + 2 \frac{1-\phi}{1+\phi} ds = 0 \\
(26) & \quad -ds + \frac{1}{2}b(\sigma-1)d\pi + \frac{1}{2}b(\sigma-1)\alpha a_R^{a-1}da_R = 0
\end{align*}
\]
We can get exact break point, $\phi^{\text{break}}$, so as to satisfy $\frac{d\pi}{da_X|_{a_X=0}} = 0$. However, the equations cannot give analytical form. Instead, by fixing $a_X$, approximate break point, $\tilde{\phi}^{\text{break}}$, can be derived. To work with this, $da_X = 0$ is inserted into (23) and (24), and then solving (23), (24), (25) and (26), solving $\frac{d\pi}{da_X|_{a_X=0}} = 0$ in terms of $\phi$, $\tilde{\phi}^{\text{Break}} = \frac{(1 - \mu)(1 - \mu + b)}{(1 + \mu)(1 + (\mu - b)a_X^\mu)}$. Next, we derive the break point in non-export fixed costs model, i.e. $a_X = 1$ and $da_X = 0$. Using (23), (25) and (26) and solving $\frac{d\pi}{da_X|_{a_X=0}} = 0$ in terms of $\phi$, we get $\phi^{\text{Break}} = \frac{(1 - \mu)(1 - \mu + b)}{(1 + \mu)(1 + \mu - b)}$. 