Monetary Policy With Endogenous Firm Entry *

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Abstract

This paper explores a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy through the extensive margin. In this paper, a shock to money induces firms to enter by affecting a measure of Tobin’s Q: the ratio of expected future profits to entry costs. In a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting, though, optimal consumption smoothing limits the flow of entering firms. As a result, the model generates positively correlated, persistent and hump-shaped responses of output, consumption and firm entry to monetary shocks, as observed in the data. This is obtained via an endogenous source of inertia and despite minimal nominal rigidities, as only one-time entry costs – as opposed to goods prices or wages – are assumed to be sticky.

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1 Introduction

Considerations of richer and more realistic firm dynamics are permeating fields as diverse as trade, real business cycles, open macro and recently monetary policy. Much of this impulse finds root in a burgeoning empirical literature having turned the spotlight on firm entry as a key driver of observed macro-economic patterns. In response to these findings, theoretical models have emerged to link the entry decision of firms to product variety, aggregate productivity, export behavior, terms of trade, and markups, uncovering new propagation mechanisms and shedding light on thus far puzzling stylized facts. This paper follows the impetus provided by this growing body of literature and attempts to extend the reflection on firm dynamics to the field of monetary policy.

In particular, this paper’s innovation is to incorporate endogenous entry into a monetary model and thereby emphasize a novel channel for the transmission of monetary policy. The appeal of this channel is its ability to reproduce stylized facts despite minimal exogenous sources of persistence. A temporary monetary shock, in this paper, generates persistent as well as hump-shaped responses of output, consumption, investment and new firm entry, as observed in the data. It also reproduces documented stylized facts showing the positive correlation of firm entry with monetary innovations. These results rest on an endogenous source of persistence and are found despite flexible goods prices. The only source of rigidity are stick sunk entry costs.

We construct a model based on monopolistic competition, in which firms have to pay a sunk cost to enter. These are meant to capture costs from the
set-up of operations, financing, hiring, R&D, marketing or other activities. For ease and clarity of exposition, we capture these sunk costs in a stylized fashion, by subsuming them into what we call legal fees, charged by lawyers. This is purely an artificial construct, or “trick”, to simplify the analysis. We also refer to firm entry throughout the paper, but the process is general enough to encompass the introduction of new products or the expansion of an existing firm or product into a new market.

We introduce nominal rigidities only in entry costs, or legal fees. We do so by assuming that lawyers set their fees according to a Calvo (1983) model. This allows monetary policy to be effective, despite goods prices remaining flexible throughout the analysis. A monetary shock affects a measure of Tobin’s Q, namely the ratio of a firm’s expected future profits to cost of entry, and propagates through the real economy by affecting investment in new firms, and thus consumption, output and other key variables. As a result, monetary policy is pro-cyclical with firm entry, as has been noted in the empirical papers reviewed below. This channel takes effect in addition to the more traditional interest rate channel of New Keynesian models.

The sluggish, hump-shaped responses central to our results rest on an endogenous source of persistence stemming from a tradeoff between consumption and investment, amplified by a time to build lag in production. We show that if lawyer fees are merely a transfer from firms to consumers, investment in new firms is not constrained by the impetus to smooth consumption. But if investment in new firms comes at the cost of consumption, a monetary shock will spread sluggishly through the economy.

A final interest of working with endogenous entry is to study the welfare
impact of monetary policy stemming from variations in product variety. We do so by showing that the expansionary effects of a monetary shock (measured in welfare-relevant terms) depend on consumers’ love of variety. This approach is inspired by the seminal work on estimating the gains from variety expansion by Broda and Weinstein (2004, 2006).

Evidence linking monetary policy to firm entry is starting to trickle through the literature. Ghironi and Melitz (2005), as well as Bilbiie et al. (2005) document in detail the notable pro-cyclicality of firm entry. The difficulty is to extract from these results the correlation between monetary policy and firm entry: it could be positive when growth in GDP emanates from an expansionary monetary policy surprise, but negative when central banks tighten policy to cool a period of strong output growth. Bergin and Corsetti (2005) help untangle the two effects using a VAR methodology. They conclude that monetary expansions are positively correlated to firm entry. These findings are corroborated in Lewis (2006) who, in a similar VAR exercise, identifies both monetary and real shocks and captures the positive and hump-shaped response of firm entry to a monetary surprise. Davis et al. (1998), in their influential book *Job Creation and Destruction*, find similar results, but at a relatively lower frequency, tied to trends in monetary policy. These findings substantiate common intuition that monetary policy affects firm behavior directly, not only through consumer demand, especially if entry is taken generally to encompass capacity expansion, new product introductions, project developments in addition to new firm incorporations.

There also exists mounting, if not comfortably established, evidence for the persistent as well as hump-shaped responses of consumption, output and
investment that our model generate. Most recently, Christiano et al. (2005) revisit some of their seminal 1999 results using a limited information VAR procedure to highlight that an expansionary monetary policy shock induces “a hump-shaped response of output, consumption and investment, a hump-shaped response in inflation, a fall in the interest rate, a rise in profits, real wages and labor productivity, and an immediate rise in the growth rate of money” (Christiano et al., 2005, p. 6). In an influential study, Romer and Romer (2004) corroborate these results after pinpointing monetary policy surprises thanks to the meticulous exercise of accounting for the intentions, information and forecasts discussed in FOMC meetings. Their implied response of output to a monetary shock follows a hump-shaped pattern, with, interestingly, an initial much smaller hump in the opposite direction. The impulse response functions emanating from our model exhibit these same features, sharing, in some cases, Romer and Romer’s ‘dual hump’ pattern.

The predictions in this paper also resonate with a well established literature outside the field of monetary policy – that of sunk costs and market structure in the field of IO. As mentioned earlier, the transmission channel for monetary policy at the heart of this paper goes from a monetary shock to sunk costs to firm entry. The latter part of this causal link is a central theme in the IO literature, captured with great clarity and detail in Sutton’s (1991) influential book Sunk Costs and Market Structure. The book builds a theory by which concentration, or the number of firms in a given industry, is a positive function of market size and a negative function of set-up, or sunk, costs. This relationship is so general, argues Sutton, that it fits both industries where goods are homogeneous and horizontally differentiated (as
in Shaked and Sutton, 1987) and is supported by a very comprehensive set of case studies.

This paper contributes to several literatures, in part by virtue of straddling the traditional New Keynesian literature and that on firm entry dynamics. With respect to the former, we build the monetary side of the model using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, as prescribed by much of the literature’s representative works, such as Goodfriend and King (1998), Clarida et al. (1999), Gali (2002), or Woodford (2003). We add money in the utility function and budget constraint, yet we introduce a much less severe form of price stickiness than inherent in these models, by allowing goods prices to remain flexible throughout the analysis. We only restrict the one-time sunk entry costs from adapting immediately to monetary surprises by imposing a time-contingent Calvo (1983) pricing behavior on lawyers. Despite this minimal source of rigidity, monetary policy has significant real consequences.

One of the drawbacks of standard New Keynesian models is their inability to generate sufficient sluggishness (slow to move away from steady state) and persistence (slow to move back to steady state) in the responses of inflation and real variables to a monetary shock. Gali and Gertler (1999), as well as Gali (2002), discuss this limitation and offer an inroad to a solution, by assuming that a certain percentage of firms are backward, and not forward, looking. Although this assumption alters the results as desired, this line of reasoning has been criticized as somewhat ad-hoc.

More recent models have noticeably improved predictive capacity while offering sounder micro-foundations, but at the cost of a series of exogenous as-
sumptions introducing rigidities; a direction we try to avoid. One of the most successful papers in capturing hump-shaped responses to monetary shocks is Christiano et al. (2005). This model essentially dampens the reaction of marginal costs to monetary shocks, by introducing wage stickiness and variable capital utilization, as well as habit formation in preferences and adjustment costs in investment. We hope to provide an alternative modeling approach, resting on fewer sources of exogenous inertia and emphasizing closer ties with microfoundations.

With respect to the literature on firm entry dynamics, this paper’s innovation is to extend the techniques and reflections to the field of monetary policy. The backbone of our model is inspired in great part from the influential work of Bilbiie et al. (2005) in the real business cycle literature. Indeed, we borrow this model’s firm dynamics based on sunk entry costs and a one period lag separating entry from production, thus making the number of firms a state variable. In fact, it is these two elements that differentiate the real part of our model from the earlier work of Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) who also consider endogenous entry but with fixed period-by-period costs and instantaneous entry. Like in Bilbiie et al. (2005), we also allow consumers to invest in new firms as an additional channel to bring wealth from one period to the next. Despite these similarities (which we try to emphasize for ease of reading by adopting similar notation wherever possible), we differ not only in adding a monetary side to the model, but also in our specification of entry costs as being only in consumption units, and not absorbing labor from production.

1Other seminal, but older papers, are Fuhrer and Moore (1995) or Blanchard and Katz (1999), which offer stories based on inertial wage setting behavior.
Some other papers have recently tackled the impact of monetary policy on the extensive margin, each with a different perspective and each – like ours – tentatively suggesting an inroad into this new literature. While our paper concentrates on the propagation mechanism of monetary policy and obtaining realistic impulse response functions, Bergin and Corsetti (2005) focus instead on the welfare implications of monetary policy. Indeed, Bergin and Corsetti (2005) simplify firm dynamics to concentrate instead on a rich discussion and comparison of optimal policy rules, as well as build an argument for the role of central banks to regulate product variety. Firms, in their paper, only live two periods and goods prices are set one period in advance. This yields a positive correlation between a monetary expansion and firm entry, as well as some persistence in entry, but no persistence in output, nor, by extension, consumption. More recently, Lewis (2006) and Bilbiie et al. (2007) offer similar perspectives on the issue. Lewis (2006) closely reproduces the RBC model in Bilbiie et al. (2005), but adds monopoly power in wage setting, thereby making monetary policy effective. The model is especially oriented to inform a convincing empirical part in which a VAR methodology is used to estimate impulse responses to both real and monetary shocks. Finally, Bilbiie et al. (2007) construct a model with sticky goods prices yielding a somewhat roundabout but innovative transmission channel of monetary policy going from interest rates to bond prices, to equity prices, to marginal costs, to inflation. The model allows for a rich discussion of optimal policy and comparisons to traditional New Keynesian models. It also produces desirable predictions of pro-cyclical profits and output, yet produces anti-cyclical entry. The latter comes from the distortionary effects of inflation on
entry, as firm profits are affected by quadratic price adjustment costs.²

Finally, it is important to distinguish this paper from the New Keynesian monetary literature with endogenous, or firm specific, capital and time to build lags. It is true, as Bilbiie et al. (2005) point out, that there is a parallel between the number of firms and capital stock, as well as between firm entry and investment. Yet, especially in monetary models, the parallel is limited. In models such as Woodford (2005), Mash (2002), Casares (2002), or even Christiano et al. (2005), a long time to build lag as well as sticky prices, sticky wages and adjustment costs are necessary to yield plausible results, contrarily to our reliance on endogenous sources of persistence. In particular, the substantial time to build lag is an integral and external source of sluggishness in these models, while in our model the one period lag exists primarily for technical reasons: to generate a difference equation. Sluggishness is instead rooted in consumption smoothing.

This paper is organized as follows. Section (2) lays out the benchmark model under flexible entry costs and section (3) overviews the corresponding impulse response functions emanating from a shock to entry costs. Going through this initial exercise achieves three goals. First, it presents the model’s core elements, which are common to the sticky entry cost form-

²Other papers of particular interest, but more distantly related, are worth mentioning. Stebunovs (2006) considers the impact on bank deregulation on entry, emphasizing the role of sunk entry costs. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) is the primary paper reviving interest in firm dynamics in an open macro framework, suggesting an endogenous explanation for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and a new hypothesis for the terms of trade effect of a productivity shock. Corsetti et al. (2005) draw an important distinction between productivity gains that lower marginal costs versus entry costs and study the effect of each on terms of trade and welfare. Finally, Chen et al. (2006) show how greater openness increases average productivity and decreases markups, thus keeping inflation in check. Each paper incorporates different aspects of firm dynamics to reach novel conclusions and insist on the interplay between microfoundations and macro phenomena.
lation. Second, it introduces the endogenous source of inertia in a simple environment. Third, it builds intuition for the transmission of monetary policy, since a monetary shock affects the economy in similar ways as a shock to entry costs. Section (4) formally introduces nominal rigidities in entry costs and shows how monetary policy can be effective. Section (5) follows with a discussion of simulation results under sticky entry costs. Finally, section (6) concludes.

2 The benchmark model with flexible prices and entry costs

2.1 Firms’ basics

Firms are assumed to be homogeneous. Given symmetry, we avoid using the $i$ subscript to denote firm specific variables and instead use lower case letters unless otherwise noted (by contrast, capital letters capture aggregate variables). Firms employ only labor, $l_t$, and produce with a common level of productivity, $Z_t$. Output per firm can be summarized as:

$$y_t = Z_t l_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Firms choose an optimal price to maximize profits given by:

$$d^n_t = \left( p_t - \frac{W_t}{Z_t} \right) y_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

where $W_t$ is the nominal wage, and the superscript $n$ indicates nominal variables, wherever a distinction is called for. As is usual in a CES environment (specified later), the resulting optimal price corresponds to a fixed markup over nominal marginal costs:

$$p_t = \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right) \frac{W_t}{Z_t}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)
where $\theta > 1$ is the degree of substitution between varieties in the CES consumption index (defined later).

### 2.2 Firm dynamics

Firms are not only free to set their price, but also to enter the economy, a decision they make if their expected profits pay back a sunk entry cost, $f_{E,t}$. Contrarily to Bilbiie et al. (2005), we define entry costs not in terms of effective labor units, but of consumption units, again with the goal of introducing the minimal set of assumptions necessary to obtain realistic impulse response functions. We will see later how this cost is pivotal to introduce nominal rigidities, as it can be seen as sticky or determined in advance.

There are many possible interpretations for such an entry barrier. These include costs such as setup, recruitment, market research, financing, product adaptation, advertising, R&D, or legal. For simplicity and clarity of exposition, we subsume all possible costs into the latter and assume that firms must pay a lawyer an amount $f_{E,t}$ before entering. Technically, this is equivalent to assuming a horizontal supply curve for legal services at the level $f_{E,t}$. Again, as highlighted in the introduction, this is purely an artificial construct to simplify the analysis; when speaking of lawyers, we should in fact continue to keep in mind the above mentioned sources of entry costs.

Firms weigh these entrance fees against the expected net present value of profits from engaging in business. In doing so, firms also take into account an exogenously defined probability $\delta$ of being hit by a so-called “death shock”,

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inducing them to exit.\(^3\) Thus, firm value is defined as:

\[
v_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \beta(t) \left( \frac{C_s}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} d_s \right]
\]

(4)

where \(\beta\) is a subjective time discount factor and the consumption ratio appears as a stochastic discount factor to take into account variations in output from one period to another.

We know that at equilibrium, when all firms have entered, the expected net present value of profits must equal the entry cost. Indeed, when these two measures are equalized, there is no more incentive for additional firms to enter. Thus, we call this point the \textit{free entry condition}, defined as:

\[
v_t = f_{E,t}
\]

(5)

The last piece to the puzzle is the time to build lag which we assume characterizes entering firms, as in Bilbäie et al. (2005). Mathematically, this is an important assumption to give \(N_t\), the state variable, a proper equation of motion. From an intuitive standpoint, the assumption is just as defendable, as new firms may have to build clientele, a distribution network, a brand or simply a new product, after sinking their entry costs, but before being able to sell anything. The equation of motion for the number of firms is therefore

\[
N_t = (1 - \delta)(N_{t-1} + N_{E,t-1})
\]

(6)

where \(N_{E,t-1}\) is the number of firms that entered in period \(t - 1\) and are able to produce in period \(t\). Thus, \(N_t\) is the number of active firms in any given period \(t\).

\(^3\)This is a simplified, yet important assumption to keep the number of firms finite and ensure that the number of firms returns to equilibrium after a shock. A more elaborate form of this assumption could account for state- or time-contingent exit, as in Hopenhayn (1992a, 1992b). See Melitz (2003) for a more detailed discussion of both entry costs and exit shocks.
2.3 Introducing the consumption-investment tradeoff

Before considering the equations characteristic of consumer demand, it is important to discuss a fundamental assumption giving rise to the inertial responses of the model’s real variables. Consumers are worker-owners. Their revenues, made up of wages and firm profits, account for aggregate production. From these proceeds, they decide how much to consume and how much to invest in new firms by financing entry costs. In turn, new firms pay these sunk costs to a representative lawyers who, we assume, consumes the totality of her earnings. So from an aggregate standpoint, equilibrium is maintained and total consumption (from consumers and lawyers) equals output. But from the standpoint of consumers, there arises an important tradeoff between consumption and investment. Although investment is attractive to create firms which later pay dividends, it comes at the cost of foregoing present consumption. Thus, the impetus to smooth consumption bestows noticeable persistence to investment. In appendix A.1 we show how consumers’ and lawyers’ consumption can be aggregated such that the usual CES results hold.

In the appendix (A.4 – A.7), we also introduce a second variant of the baseline model considered here, in which there is no tradeoff between consumption and investment, since lawyers simply rebate their earnings to consumers without absorbing any of the economy’s production. This is a standard assumption, characteristic, for instance, of models with endogenous capital. Thus, consumption is not constrained by the creation of new firms. It is useful to juxtapose these two variants, as we do when discussing results, to help emphasize the key role played by the consumption-investment
2.4 Consumer behavior

In this section and those following, we consider only the consumption of consumers, while we postpone the analysis of the consumption of lawyers (whose utility function is isomorphic, except that they have an infinite discount factor and thus undertake no investment; details are provided in appendix A.1). We come back to join the two sources of consumption when considering aggregate accounting in section 2.7.

The model is characterized by a representative consumer maximizing her infinite lifetime utility over consumption, $C_t$, real money balances, $M_t/P_t$ and leisure, $L_t$. For simplicity, we assume a separable utility function given by:

$$U_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left( \frac{C_s^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} + \frac{(M_s/P_s)^{1-\nu}}{1-\nu} - \frac{L_s^{(\varphi+1)/\varphi}}{(\varphi + 1)/\varphi} \right) \right]$$

(7)

where $\beta$ is a subjective discount factor.

The budget constraint must be altered slightly with respect to standard monetary models to account for firm dynamics, by allowing consumers to invest in risk free bonds as well as in a risky but potentially more rewarding mutual fund of firms. Each period, consumers can choose to buy a share $x_t$ of this fund, at a price equal to the expected net present value of profits of all existing firms: $v_t(N_t + N_{E,t})$. Investment in the mutual fund yields dividends one period later, equal to profits of all operating firms, $N_{t+1}d_{t+1}$, in addition to the liquidation value of the portfolio, $v_{t+1}N_{t+1}$. Thus, the representative consumer faces the following constraint, written in nominal terms (where,
again, the superscript $n$ clarifies, if necessary, when a variable is nominal):

$$P_t C_t + M_t + R_t^{-1} B_t + v_t^n (N_t + N_{E,t}) x_t =$$

$$M_{t-1} + B_{t-1} + W_t L_t + (d^n_t + v^n_t) N_t x_{t-1} + T_t$$

(8)

where $R_t \equiv (1 + i_t)$ and $i_t$ is the nominal interest rate, $B_t$ are zero coupon nominal bonds, and $T_t$ are lump sum seignorage transfers, such that $M_t = M_{t-1} + T_t$ in equilibrium. Note that by making use of the free entry condition (5), the amount consumers allocate to financing new firm entry, $v^n_t N_{E,t} x_t$, is in fact the sum of all entry fees paid to lawyers, $f^n_{E,t} N_{E,t} x_t$. As per the earlier discussion on the consumption-investment tradeoff, these fees are relinquished to lawyers and thus do not show up on the right hand side of the budget constraint (as they would if they were rebated to consumers, as in the model’s second variant presented in the appendix).

Aggregate consumption, $C_t$, is defined as:

$$C_t = A_t \left( \int_{N_t} c_t^{(\theta - 1)/\theta} d\theta \right)^{\theta/(\theta - 1)}$$

(9)

where $A_t \equiv N_t^{\xi - \frac{1}{\theta - 1}}$, as in Benassy (1996). This term allows us to dissociate consumers’ love of variety from the elasticity of substitution between goods. This is particularly important in our case since we work with variables that are “welfare relevant” in the way that they take into account the effect of variety on consumer utility. Thus, the use of $A_t$ allows us to explicitly test the robustness of our results to the link between variety and utility. Indeed, we may either be interested in measuring welfare, or in matching commonly available data (since most statistical agencies do not account for variety in

\footnote{It is becoming increasingly common to find such a specification in the literature. See, for instance, Corsetti et al. (2005), Bergin and Corsetti (2005), or the appendix of Bilbiie et al. (2005).}
reporting prices, or at least do so at a low frequency). Indeed, note that when \( \xi = 1/(\theta - 1) \), the above consumption index simplifies to the classic Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case, but when \( \xi = 0 \), there is no more love of variety and, in particular, aggregate prices equal firm specific prices, as is evident from the definitions below.

Accordingly, aggregate prices are found by summing firm specific prices in the following way:

\[
P_t = \frac{1}{A_t} \left( \int_{N_t} p_t(i)^{1-\theta} \, di \right) \left( \frac{1}{\theta - 1} \right) \]

so that the relative price, \( \rho_t \) can be expresses as:

\[
\rho_t \equiv \frac{p_t}{P_t} = N_t^\xi = \left[ \frac{\theta}{(\theta - 1)} \right] \omega_t / Z_t
\]

since \( p_t \) is the same for all firms. The relative price \( \rho_t \) will lead to useful simplifications down the line. For now, it is important to emphasize that when \( \xi \) is positive, a rise in the number of firms will depress the aggregate price \( P_t \), everything else equal. This is commonly referred to as the variety effect. More firms offer a wider range of choices to consumers, thus increasing value per unit of expenditure. In this way, the aggregate price is “welfare relevant” (as are all real variables in our model), capturing “subjective value” as perceived by consumers.

### 2.5 Optimality conditions

On this backdrop, consumers optimize both between consumption, leisure and real money held in any given period, as well as between consumption in subsequent periods. This yields the following first order conditions:
With respect to real money balances:

\[
\left( \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)^\nu = \frac{C_t^\gamma}{1 - R_t^{-1}} \tag{12}
\]

With respect to labor (the labor supply function):

\[
\frac{W_t}{P_t} = L_t^{1/\phi} C_t^\gamma \tag{13}
\]

With respect to bonds (the Euler equation in bonds):

\[
C_t^{-\gamma} = \beta R_t E_t \left[ C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] \tag{14}
\]

With respect to shares (the Euler equation in shares):\(^5\)

\[
C_t^{-\gamma} = \beta (1 - \delta) E_t \left[ \left( \frac{d_{t+1} + v_{t+1}}{v_t} \right) C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \right] \tag{15}
\]

Total demand for any given variety in period \(t\) is instead given by:

\[
y_t = A_t^{\theta - 1} \left( \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right)^{-\theta} Y_t \tag{16}
\]

where \(Y_t\) represents total expenditure on goods, equal to both consumers’ and lawyers’ consumption, as shown in section 2.7 below and discussed in more details in appendix A.1.

### 2.6 A closer look at the labor market

The aggregate pricing condition (11) and the optimal firm price equation (3) can be combined to yield an expression for the real wage \(\omega_t\):

\[
\omega_t = Z_t \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} N_t^\xi \tag{17}
\]

which is in itself an interesting equation, underlying the fact that as the number of firms increases, real wages must also increase to attract more

\(^5\)Note, as is standard, that the forward solution to this Euler equation yields the equation for firm value in (4).
workers as needed by the greater number of firms. The above expression, along with the labor supply function (13), yields an expression for total labor employed as a function of the number of firms and consumption:

\[ L_t = N_t^{\xi \varphi} \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right)^{\varphi} Z_t^\varphi C_t^{-\gamma \varphi} \] (18)

where it is clear that labor supply rises in tandem with real wages, but decreases with consumption, due to the decreasing marginal utility of consumption.

We also know that in aggregate, by assuming full employment, labor market accounting suggests that \( L_t = N_t l_t \).\(^6\) We then specify an aggregate production function taking the form \( Y_t = N_t \rho_t y_t = N_t^{\xi+1} y_t \), since all firms are homogeneous and where \( \rho_t \) is included to convert output in terms of the consumption good (in real terms). Coupled with the firm level production function (1), this allows us to obtain an interesting form of the aggregate production function:

\[ Y_t = N_t^{\xi} Z_t L_t = N_t^{\xi (1+\varphi)} Z_t^{1+\varphi} \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right)^{\varphi} C_t^{-\gamma \varphi} \] (19)

where the number of firms enters to capture the impact of variety on output, again underscoring the “welfare-relevant” nature of our real variables. This effect is in fact both direct and indirect, as shown by the inclusion of \( N_t \) in the middle equation as well as in the far right equation, where it enters through real wages and labor supply.

\(^6\)Note that this labor market accounting condition is different from the more complicated equivalent found in the New Keynesian literature, as in Gali (2002), where, due to Calvo pricing, not all firms charge the same price at any given time, thus producing different amounts of output and employing different numbers of workers. In that case, we cannot simplify the integral \( L_t = \int_{N_t} l_t \, dt \) to \( L_t = N_t l_t \), as above, but must take into account price distortions.
Finally, using the equation for profits (2), the equation for relative prices (11), the labor supply equation (18) and the aggregate production function above (19), we derive a useful expression for firm profits:

\[ d_t = \frac{Y_t}{\theta N_t} \]  

(20)

Thus, firms’ profits naturally increase with aggregate output and decrease with the degree of substitutability between goods (a measure of competitive intensity) and the number of firms (which, as per the variety effect discussed earlier, increase each firm’s relative price \( \rho_t \), thus depressing sales per firm). This latter effect, though, is partially offset by the positive relationship between output, \( Y_t \), and the number of firms.

### 2.7 Aggregate accounting

When aggregating the budget constraint over all consumers, and imposing equilibrium conditions such that bonds are in zero net supply (or \( B_t = B_{t-1} = 0 \)), the representative consumer holds the entire equity portfolio (or \( x_t = x_{t-1} = 1 \)) and lump sum transfers from seignorage exactly match money growth (or \( M_t = M_{t-1} + T_t \)), we obtain:

\[ P_t C_t + v^o_t N_{E,t} = W_t L_t + d^n_t N_t = Y^n_t \]  

(21)

where the left hand side represents aggregate consumption and net investment, and the right hand side labor and profit revenue (or returns on investment) which can be shown to equal aggregate output (see appendix A.1 for the derivation), thus satisfying general equilibrium.
2.8 Steady state analysis

The complete derivation of steady state results appears in appendix A.2. Here, we instead report the results central to our story, namely the correlation between entry costs and consumption as well as the number of firms. The two equations we retain from the appendix are:

\[
N = \left( \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \right) \left[ Z^{(1+\varphi)} \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right)^{\varphi} N^{\xi(1+\varphi)} C^{-\gamma\varphi} - C \right] / f_E \tag{22}
\]

and

\[
C = f_E N \theta \left( \frac{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)}{\beta(1 - \delta)} - \frac{\delta}{(1 - \delta)\theta} \right) \tag{23}
\]

These equations are especially eloquent (after some manipulation, as shown in appendix A.2) on the long term negative effects of a rise in entry costs on the number of firms and consumption. Indeed, as shown in appendix A.2, \( \frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} < 0 \), confirming general intuition. An increase in \( f_E \) raises firm value as confirmed by the free entry condition (5). Recall that firm value, \( v \), is also equal to the expected net present value of profits. Thus, for a constant discount factor, the only way that \( v \) can appreciate is for profits to increase as well. And as discussed above, profits grow as the number of firms diminishes and output per firm rises. Thus, not only does the steady state analysis confirm the intimate relationship between the entry cost and the number of firms, as intuition would have told us from the beginning, but it turns the spotlight on the free entry condition as the main constraint on firm dynamics. To complete our overview of the steady state, we also note that \( \frac{\partial C}{\partial f_E} > 0 \) (also shown in the appendix), since fewer firms will need less investment to offset dying firms and thus allow for more consumption.
2.9 Solving for the model’s dynamics

Our goal here is to define a system of minimal dimensions sufficient to solve for the model’s state variables. The Euler equation in shares (15) constitutes the first difference equation in $C_t$ and $N_t$. The second equation comes from the equation of motion of firms (6). In both cases, we must first solve for the number of new firms, $N_{E,t}$.

To do so, we use the aggregate accounting condition (21), which acts as a constraint on how much investment can be undertaken given a level of consumption and earnings. We obtain:

$$N_{E,t} = Z_1^{1+\phi} (\frac{\theta-1}{\theta})^{\phi} N_t^{\phi(1+\phi)} C_t^{\gamma \phi} - C_t$$

(24)

 Appropriately, in steady state, $\partial N_E/\partial f_E < 0$, as well as $\partial N_E/\partial C < 0$, as shown in appendix A.2. This indicates that as entry costs increase fewer firms are created, thereby confirming that there is indeed a tradeoff between investing in new firms and consuming. The solution to $N_{E,t}$ can then be plugged into the equation of motion of firms which, with the Euler equation in shares, yields a system of two difference equations with a stable solution. Appendix A.3 presents this system in linearized form, as well as the additional equations needed to find the remaining variables of interest, once the paths for $C_t$ and $N_t$ have been resolved.
3 Simulation results under flexible prices and exogenous entry costs

3.1 Calibrations

In order for our results to be comparable to those in the relevant literatures, we employ standard parameter values to calibrate our model. We assume log utility for consumption and thus set $\gamma = 1$, in line with real business cycle models, such that wealth and substitution effects cancel and the model be consistent with a balanced growth path. We follow Gali (2002) who draws from Chari et al. (1997) in setting the semi-elasticity of money demand, $\nu$, to unity. We also work with a very low wage elasticity of labor supply since we consider a short run impact, and thus set $\varphi = 0.25$. We relax this assumption in the more detailed analysis of sticky entry costs dynamics. As is standard in the real business cycle literature, we interpret periods as quarters and set $\beta = 0.99$. We then follow Bilbiie et al. (2005), who set the elasticity of substitution between goods, $\theta$, to 3.8, as in Bernard et al. (2003), instead of the higher 6 used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) or 11 as in Gali (2002). We also set the death shock as in Bilbiie et al. (2005) to 0.025 in line with findings of approximately 10% labor destruction per year. In addition, we work with $\xi = 1/(\theta - 1)$ as in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case, so that the love of variety and the elasticity of substitution between goods concur. We introduce different values of $\xi$ in later robustness tests. Finally, for all simulations in this paper, we consider that productivity remains constant.
3.2 Benchmark model with tradeoff

In these simulations, we concentrate on shocks to entry costs, to build intuition for the more complex mechanisms underlying the transmission of monetary policy. In figure 1, we therefore limit our attention to the variables most instructive for our model’s fundamental dynamics: $C_t$, $N_t$, and $N_{E,t}$.

We consider the shock to entry costs to be temporary. We thus assume $\hat{f}_{E,t+1} = \phi \hat{f}_{E,t} + \epsilon_t$, where $\epsilon_t$ is increased by 1% at the time of the shock. This yields a path of sunk costs shown in figure 1, returning to steady state after 50 periods. But the duration of the shock is an artifact of our particular parameter values, notably of our somewhat arbitrary choice of $\phi = 0.9$. It is rather the shock’s effect on other variables that is central.

The first result to stand out is the persistence of the model’s variables over and above that of entry costs. This can be seen most clearly in the impulse response of the number of firms which strays from steady state for about 70 periods (thus 40% longer than entry costs). In graphs generated with $\phi = 0.09$, this result is even more striking; entry costs are back at their steady state level within a few periods, but the number of firms only returns to steady state after about 35 periods.\footnote{These results are available upon request.}

The tradeoff between consumption and investment – at the origin of the inertia noted above – is most evident in the path of consumption. Initially, when entry costs are lowest and investment ($N_{E,t}$) at its peak, consumption must decrease below steady state to satisfy the budget constraint. Only after a few periods does consumption rise again, following the increase in the number of firms.
Investment – or the creation of new firms – peaks early, and later overshoots its steady state. This illustrates several mechanisms. First, there are intertemporal effects, in that firms try to enter as close as possible to the trough in entry costs. This explains the drop to below steady state investment after the original peak. But, second, because of the impetus to smooth consumption, investment is not instantaneous, but stretches over the first 25 periods. As a result, the number of firms and consumption follow a regular hump-shaped pattern. This result has potentially important empirical implications, suggesting that the contemporaneous correlation between entry costs and the number of new firms would be not be as high as perhaps intuitively expected, even if, in fact, the two are intimately related.

Finally, our results substantiate our discussion of the steady state. Indeed, the number of firms moves in the opposite direction as entry costs. As discussed earlier, lower sunk costs depress expected firm value in equilibrium, calling for lower profits and thus a greater number of total firms.

3.3 Benchmark model without tradeoff

As mentioned earlier, we develop a second variant of the benchmark model (in appendix A.4 – A.7) where the fees received by lawyers are rebated to consumers, thus nullifying the tradeoff between consumption and investment. The impulse responses in this second variant are worth briefly dwelling upon, as they clearly show the central role played by the consumption-investment tradeoff in generating persistence and sluggishness. Indeed, a look at figure 2 immediately confirms that any inertia in the number of firms or consumption only mimics that of entry costs. In other words, there is no additional inertia in the system than that exogenously assumed in the driving variable.
The behavior of investment – or the number of new firms – is interesting none-the-less. With respect to the earlier variant, there is a much stronger inter-temporal shift in the creation of firms towards the period immediately following the shock. Indeed, that is when sunk costs are lowest. Although they remain below steady state for another fifty periods, firms prefer to take advantage of the most favorable possible conditions for entry, especially when investment is not constrained by consumption smoothing objectives. As shown in the graph, firm creation even becomes negative after the initial boom. We therefore notice no smoothing of investment what-so-ever (as a result of the lack of tradeoff with consumption).

Consumption (equal to output in this variant of the model since lawyers don’t consume; see appendix A.5 for details) instead follows the number of producing firms. This confirms our earlier discussion suggesting that although firm-specific output decreases with more firms, aggregate output increases. Finally, the fact that consumption is free to increase while new firms are created comes from the lack of tradeoff between consumption and investment.

4 The model with nominal rigidities

4.1 The channel of transmission

We have seen that firms decide to enter based on the relationship between expected profits and cost of entry. Thus, in order to be effective, monetary policy must be in a position to alter either one, or the ratio of the two, which is akin to Tobin’s Q. Of course, from a modeling standpoint, this poses an interesting question. On which side should nominal rigidities be modeled:
expected profits or costs of entry? Expected profits are discounted by the real interest rate, as seen in equation (4). A possible channel for monetary policy transmission would therefore be to affect the real interest rate, and thereby the net present value of firm profits and in turn firm entry. Although plausible, we choose to emphasize the reverse of the coin, namely the effect of monetary policy on the cost of entry. We do so for four major reasons which we enumerate below. Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that fundamentally, in our model, monetary policy affects Tobin’s Q, and through that, investment and consumption.

First, we aim to introduce minimal exogenous persistence in order not to steal the spotlight from the model’s endogenous source of inertia discussed at length above. The link between monetary policy and real interest rates typically comes by assuming price rigidity in the goods market. But in our case, this would introduce an additional source of persistence that would be hard to untangle in the interpretation of results. Second, assuming that monetary policy affects the real interest rate could also come from a rigidity in nominal rates. But this would entail modeling at least a rudimentary credit market and possibly allowing firms to finance entry costs by issuing risky corporate debt; a very plausible assumption, yet one that detracts from the model’s simplicity. Third, expected profits are generally hard to estimate and usually expressed with a wide range. Changes in real interest rates do little to change these vague forecasts. Instead, what is more tangible to firm

8Where, as per the Euler equation in bonds (14), the stochastic discount factor $\beta \left( \frac{C_t}{C_{t+1}} \right)^{\kappa - 1}$ is equivalent to the real interest rate, defined as $R_t = (P_{t+1} - P_t)$ in linear terms.

9The work of Stebunovs (2006), mentioned in the introduction, could be used as a basis to extend our model in this direction.
managers and entrepreneurs is the cost of entry. Changes in these are an important driver of investment decisions.\textsuperscript{10} Fourth, we like to emphasize the central role played by entry costs, in order to pick up where the IO literature leaves off, namely in linking firm entry, or concentration, to a market’s sunk entry costs. Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991), for instance, make this relationship the center piece of their analysis.

4.2 Introducing nominal rigidities in entry costs

Given the above arguments, we introduce stickiness in entry costs, or lawyer fees. This allows a monetary surprise to affect the real value of entry costs and thereby engender similar reactions in the model’s variables as seen in our earlier exercise under flexible prices and exogenous entry costs. More specifically, we assume that lawyers set their fees as in the model of Calvo (1983). Following the usual modeling route would have led us to working with imperfectly differentiated lawyers. Yet, in our case, this would have complicated the analysis and detracted from the plausibility of the story: why should lawyers be differentiated? Where do they derive monopoly power? Where do profits go to? To circumvent these issues, we instead assume a representative lawyer (of a pool of perfectly competitive lawyers), who faces a probability of not being able to reset her price in any period.\textsuperscript{11} In the end, results for the optimal setting of fees are equivalent, in linear form, to a more standard imperfect competition Calvo model.

We thus work with a representative lawyer able to reset her price each

\textsuperscript{10}This resonates with anecdotal evidence related by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists that ideas abound, but the main limitation to their development is the availability or cost of funding.

\textsuperscript{11}Many thanks so Jean Imbs to have suggested this clever simplification.
period with a probability \((1 - \lambda)\). Recall that total expenditures on entry fees are given by \(v_tn_tN_{E,t}\) or \(f_{E,t}N_{E,t}\), as defined in the budget constraint (8). Thus, \(N_{E,t}\) can be seen as capturing the total number of fees paid to the representative lawyer (one contract per firm, say) and \(f_{E,t}\) the actual entry fee. Furthermore, we assume that the representative lawyer, on her end, is concerned with covering her marginal costs defined as:

\[
MC^n_t = f_E P_t
\]

where the aggregate price of consumption goods is used to transform real values to nominal ones. This marginal cost does not mean that the lawyer has to pay a production input. The cost is instead non-tangible, capturing, for instance, the opportunity cost of time. This assumption simplifies the analysis without detracting from the model’s core message. Conveniently, this definition of marginal costs implies that optimal real fees, when the setting of fees is flexible, is \(f_E\), which is as specified in the earlier benchmark analysis without nominal rigidities (except, of course, that the prior analysis considered time varying fees).

What remains to be found is the optimal fee, or cost of entry, \(f_{E,t}^*\), charged by the representative lawyer given the probability of not being able to reset fees each period. We assume the lawyer maximizes her profit function with respect to the quantity of contracts, while facing a horizontal demand curve as lawyers are non-differentiated. The profits function is given by:

\[
\max_{N_{E,t}} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k E_t \left[ \beta^k \left( f_{E,t}^n N_{E,t+k} - TC^n_{t+k}(N_{E,t+k}) \right) \right]
\]

Results are standard and discussed in more details in appendix B.1. It can be shown that the optimal fee is forward looking, taking into account the prob-
ability of not being able to alter entry fees for several periods. In deviations from steady state (expressed by “hats”), this yields:

\[ \hat{f}_{E,t}^* = \lambda \beta \left[ E_t \left( \hat{P}_{t+1} - \hat{P}_t \right) + \lambda E_t \left( \hat{f}_{E,t+1}^* \right) \right] \] (27)

Thus, if \( \lambda \), the parameter capturing the degree of stickiness, were equal to zero – consistently with flexible fees – \( \hat{f}_{E,t}^* \) would also equal zero, meaning that lawyers would be able to reset their fees to exactly match any inflation, so that (real) entry fees would not deviate from steady state and the nominal fee would just cover nominal marginal costs. This is consistent with equation 25. In this case, monetary policy would be ineffective. On the contrary, when \( 0 < \lambda \leq 1 \), monetary policy regains its channel of transmission because of the sluggishness in the revision of entry fees.

Finally, since the representative lawyer can only resent her fees with probability \( (1 - \lambda) \), entry fees at any given time are given by the usual aggregate price condition under Calvo (1983)-type rigidities.\(^{12}\)\(^{13}\)

\[ \hat{f}_{E,t} = (1 - \lambda) \hat{f}_{E,t}^* + \lambda (\hat{P}_{t+1} - \hat{P}_t) \] (28)

### 4.3 Model dynamics

The model with sticky entry costs introduces two new difference equations, capturing the newly introduced rigidities: the equation for optimal lawyer fees (27) and the resulting equation for entry costs (28), listed above. To complete the system, we add the equations listed in the flexible fees version

\(^{12}\)Usually, this condition represents a snapshot in time of prices weighed by the firms that have reset and those that have not. In the case of a representative firm – or lawyer, as in our case – the formula above represents the expected, or average, price in any period.

\(^{13}\)This condition is more intuitive when expressed in nominal terms: \( \hat{f}_{E,t}^* = (1 - \lambda) \hat{f}_{E,t}^* + \lambda \hat{f}_{E,t-1} \)
of the model, namely the equation of motion for the number of firms (6) along with the solution for new firm entry (24), and the Euler equation in shares (15). The additional equations (in linearized form) needed to solve for all the other variables of interest appear in Appendix B.2.

Imposing nominal rigidities only on the legal sector simplifies the analysis significantly by establishing a clear dichotomy between the real and monetary parts of the model. The equations capturing price stickiness become mere add-ons to an already familiar system, so that the effects of monetary policy feed right into the established dynamics of the flexible fees model reviewed earlier. Thus, we can expect to find very similar results to the simulations in section 3.

We consider the driving force behind the system’s dynamics to be a shock to the growth of the money supply, as is standard in many New Keynesian monetary models. We define a monetary shock as an unexpected change in the growth rate of money, given an autoregressive process for money growth known by all agents:

\[ \Delta M_t = \rho_M \Delta M_{t-1} + \epsilon_t \]

where the shock \( \epsilon_t \) takes a value of zero except in period \( t \), thereby giving a one time impulse to the system.

5 Simulation results with sticky entry costs

5.1 Calibrations

We retain the principal parameter values chosen for the simulations under flexible fees. In addition to these, we set \( \rho_M \) to 0.9, to mirror the autoregres-

\[ ^{14} \text{See Gali (2002), for instance.} \]
sive coefficient on sunk costs used earlier. We set $\lambda$ to 0.75, as in Gali (2002). This corresponds, on average, to entry costs sticking for four quarters. Also, we work with several different wage elasticities of labor supply: 0.25, 1, and 4. As King and Rebelo (2000) remind us, the assumption of log-utility in consumption and a low steady state fraction of time spent working imply a wage elasticity of labor supply of four. Microeconomic evidence, though, suggest that these are typically much lower than unity (see Pencavel, 1986, for instance).

5.2 Results and comments

Impulse response functions are presented in figure 3. Here, as opposed to the results for flexible (and exogenous) fees, we list a much wider range of variables. The results we discuss below follow a one standard deviation shock (based on an assumed variance of 10) to the growth rate of money. This induces money growth to jump, then gradually come back to steady state. The money stock thus increases gradually (at a decreasing rate) to its new steady state. Prices, as expected, jump then follow an upward path to settle at a higher equilibrium. The representative lawyer is caught off guard due to the unexpected nature of the shock. But immediately thereafter will attempt to reset her price with probability $(1 - \lambda)$ as a function of her expectations of future prices. Thus, real aggregate entry costs decrease initially, then increase slowly to return to their original steady state. As can be seen in figure 3.

One particularity, of relatively minor interest, is worth noting first. Real entry costs do not immediately drop to their lowest levels, but take three to four periods to do so. This is simply due to the interplay in the dynamics of
entry costs (28) between $\hat{f}_{E,t+1}^*$ and $(\hat{P}_{t+1} - \hat{P}_t)$ in equation (28); since after
the original jump in prices the latter is much larger than the former, $\hat{f}_{E,t+1}^*$ is
pulled down with respect to $\hat{f}_{E,t}$. As the change in prices quickly diminishes,
the change in entry costs becomes positive, as would be expected of the lawyer
trying to cover her higher marginal costs. This mechanism lies at the heart
of the sluggishness (slow to move away from steady state) in investment.
Secondarily, this also explains why, when labor supply is particularly high,
consumption, investment and output exhibit a somewhat surprising jolt in
the first period: firms postpone entry while waiting for lawyer fees to come
down further, a reaction similar in nature to the inter-temporal tradeoff in
investment which we recognized in the model under flexible fees.

Otherwise, figure 3 generally exhibits impulse response functions simi-
lar to those of the model under flexible fees with a tradeoff. As discussed
already, this is expected. In particular, the sluggishness and persistence of
the impulse response functions is inherited from the consumption-investment
tradeoff already present in the simpler flexible fees set-up. This similarity is
most noticeable in the path of $N_t$.

One notable difference with earlier results is that the size of the impulse
responses diminishes with the wage elasticity of labor supply. As the latter
becomes more inelastic, fewer firms are created since labor income is not
sufficient to cover as high investment levels without giving up excessive con-
sumption. This stands out when comparing two extreme cases ($\varphi = 0.25$
vs. 4): although investment is more subdued in the first case, consump-
tion still dips further than in the second case, in the face of a tighter labor
income constraint. As labor supply becomes more elastic, not only can con-
sumers afford to engage in more investment (higher peak in $N_{E,t}$), but this investment is concentrated in a shorter time frame (faster return of $N_{E,t}$ to steady state) to take advantage of the most favorable entry conditions possible. But in all three cases of labor elasticity, investment comes back to its initial steady state before entry costs, due to the inter-temporal shift in firm creation. Thus, the low contemporaneous correlation between entry costs and firm entry, as remarked earlier, continues to hold.

Of paramount importance, output ($Y_t$), consumption and investment are positively correlated to monetary surprises and display hump shaped patterns similar to those observed empirically and emphasized in Christiano et al. (2005), or Romer and Romer (2004), or even Bergin and Corsetti (2005) and Lewis (2006) concerning investment – or firm creation – in particular. The hump in output is most clear, reaching its apex seven to sixteen quarters (depending on labor elasticity) after the initial shock. Investment peaks faster, as a result of entry costs reaching their trough almost immediately.

Consumption also exhibits a smooth, hump shape, but only after an initial downward and smaller hump. This is due to the decrease in consumption following the monetary shock, as needed to free up funds for investment purposes. Romer and Romer (2004) point out a similar “double hump” pattern, but in the implied response function of output to a monetary shock.\footnote{Corresponding to figure 2 in their paper.}

Of potential importance to central banks, the model results emphasize the long lasting effects that a temporary shock can have. Although the money stock reaches its new steady state after 50 periods, real variables such as consumption, wages, production and GDP come back to steady state after about 100 periods. The actual number of periods is misleading as it is an
artifact of the somewhat debatable choice of parameters; but it remains that
the effect of monetary policy is felt for about two times longer than the policy
impetus.

Otherwise, the real interest rate, \( RR_t \), plays its expected role to clear the
inter-temporal consumption market, as warranted by the Euler equation in
bonds. Indeed, the real interest rate is positive when consumption swells
and negative when it wanes. Christiano et al. (2005) note that real rates fall
after a monetary shock. Our ability to reproduce this result is mixed: real
rates do remain in negative territory for most of their time away from steady
state, but they surge to positive levels for a short period early on. This is due
to the initial negative hump in consumption, and interest rates needing to
remain positive for a while in order to pull consumption comfortably above
steady state, a result not discussed in Christiano et al. (2005).

One apparent drawback of our model’s simulations is the lack of liquidity
effect. This was already a puzzle in traditional New Keynesian models, as
pointed out in Gali (2002), which is only able to give rise to a liquidity effect
with particular values of risk aversion and money growth autocorrelation.
We do not find a liquidity effect probably because inflation jumps too much
and too quickly (thus pushing up the nominal interest rate). In and of itself,
the lack of sluggishness in inflation is also a relative weakness of our model,
yet it follows from assuming flexible prices in the goods market, a direction
we took explicitly in order not to cloud our results with excessive exogenous
persistence. We thus made the choice of emphasizing the model’s impact on
real variables, at the expense of realistic patterns in nominal variables. A
possible extension of our model with sticky goods prices would have a better
chance of generating a liquidity effect as well as persistent inflation.

The labor market is in line with empirical findings. The increase in real wages following the monetary shock conforms with one the main stylized facts raised in Christiano et al. (2005). Labor supply (ll on the graphs) increases as expected with the real wage, $\omega_t$, as needed to attract labor to satisfy the greater number of firms and higher aggregate output. Almost by definition, the effect diminishes with the wage elasticity of labor supply. Interestingly, though, labor supply comes back to steady state relatively quickly (by even overshooting it). This is due to the decreasing marginal utility of a rising level of consumption, which peaks only after real wages do (recall the opposing effect of consumption and real wages on labor supply). In passing, note that the continued positive level of output even while labor supply is back at its steady state comes from a higher degree of available varieties; once again, this feature underlines the fact that our variables are given in welfare-relevant terms. We revisit this result in our robustness checks.

Lastly, we note that the extent and duration of all the above-mentioned impulse response functions diminish with the degree of price stickiness, $\lambda$. At the extreme, when $\lambda = 0$, we are back in the flexible fee world in which real entry costs are unaffected by monetary policy. As a result, none of the real variables budge and monetary shocks only affect prices.\textsuperscript{16}

5.3 Robustness checks: changing the love of variety

We focus here on the role of consumers’ love of variety. In the results discussed above, all simulations were run using $\xi = 1/(\theta - 1)$, as in the classic Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) case. Thus, the impulse response functions represent

\textsuperscript{16}These results are available upon request.
welfare-relevant variables. But not all statistical agencies account for variety in their published indices. And those that do, like in the U.S., do not do so at the frequency inherent in our simulations (1 period = 1 quarter). Thus, on the one hand, it may be more realistic to work with smaller $\xi$ parameters.

On the other hand, for the purposes of welfare analysis, it may be warranted to consider a strong preference for variety, as seems to be the case in industrial economies. To illustrate the effect of changes in $\xi$, we present results for three iterations of $\xi$: 0, $1/(\theta - 1)$ and 0.6 (about twice $1/(\theta - 1)$). Results appear in figure 4.

Generally, a small value of $\xi$ shaves off a significant part of the rise in consumption, investment, and output. This is as expected. The large upswings in these variables were in part driven by the diversity of product offerings. As variety is valued less (a lower $\xi$), a unit of expenditure on a good provides less consumption-based utility. Thus, consumption and investment peak lower, contributing to a flatter output curve. On the contrary, as $\xi$ increases, the effects of a monetary shock are magnified considerably.

One particular feature is worth mentioning: the correlation between output and labor supply grows as $\xi$ decreases. When love of variety is null, output is only a function of labor employed, and no longer responds to the number of firms (as can be seen in equation 19). In addition, as $\xi$ decreases, labor supply is increasingly dependent on consumption at the expense of real wages, since the latter no longer responds to the number of firms (as can be seen in equation 17). Thus, $\xi = 0$ represents the case when labor supply most overshoots its return to steady state, thereby also pushing output briefly below steady state after an initial and much larger expansion.
Lastly, we note that changes in $\xi$ affect only real variables, leaving nominal variables nearly unchanged. Again, this is due to our assumption of adjustable goods prices, whereby variations in nominal variables are dominated by the monetary shock, as in a flexible price setting.

We generally remain agnostic as to the correct choice of $\xi$, but until statistical agencies pay closer attention to variety, we note that the crux of our results, namely the hump shaped patterns in real variables following a monetary shock, remain true despite changes to the love of variety.

6 Conclusion

We found motivation for this paper among the quickly growing empirical literature pointing to the central role of firm entry and exit as an endogenous propagation mechanism for macro-economic shocks. More specifically, we were encouraged by recent empirical and anecdotal findings emphasizing the positive correlation between firm entry and monetary expansions. We were also motivated by the challenge of offering an alternative modeling response – less dependent on exogenous rigidities – to the New Keynesian models’ difficulty of generating persistent and sluggish responses to monetary surprises.

In response to these stimulations, we developed a monetary model where firm entry is endogenous. To enter, monopolistically competitive firms must pay a sunk fee, then wait one period before being able to produce. The payment of this fee is intended to be synonymous with costs such as the setting-up of operations, hiring, R&D, marketing or other activities. Entry is regulated by consumers who optimize spending between consumption and investment in new firms. This introduces an endogenous source of inertia.
in the model, as consumers aim to smooth consumption and therefore do not immediately succumb to the requests for funding when entry conditions suddenly turn favorable.

In our model, monetary policy shocks directly affect the cost-benefit analysis preceding entry, by influencing Tobin’s Q, or the ratio of expected future profits to the cost of entry. We do so by assuming that entry costs are set a la Calvo (1983), while goods prices remain flexible throughout the analysis. In doing so, we were inspired by a wide body of research in the IO literature pointing to the relevance of sunk costs for firm entry.

As a result of this apparatus, monetary policy has significant real effects, as shocks generate persistent, as well as hump shaped responses of consumption, investment, output and the number of firms. This is as observed in the data (see, for instance, Christiano et al., 2005, or Romer and Romer, 2004), but as generated only with significant difficulty, or with a series of assumed exogenous rigidities, in traditional New Keynesian models. Our model therefore stands apart as presenting minimal nominal rigidities and simple microfounded dynamics underlying a new channel for the transmission of monetary policy.

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Figure 1: Benchmark model in flexible prices, variant I: Temporary shock to $f_{E,t}$ with autoregressive coefficient 0.9. The responses exhibit endogenous persistence.
Figure 2: Benchmark model in flexible prices, variant II: Temporary shock to $f_{E,t}$ with autoregressive coefficient 0.9. The impulse responses exhibit no persistence in addition to the one in entry costs.
Figure 3: Temporary shock to money growth, with autoregressive coefficient 0.9 in a model with Calvo pricing in entry costs and different wage elasticities of labor supply. Solid line: $\varphi = 0.25$, hyphenated line: $\varphi = 1$, dotted line: $\varphi = 4$. 
Figure 4: Temporary shock to money growth, in a model with Calvo pricing in entry costs, $\varphi = 1$ and different degrees of love of variety. Hyphenated line: $\xi = 0$ (no love of variety), solid line: $\xi = 1/(\theta - 1)$ (the Dixit-Stiglitz case), dotted line: $\xi = 0.6$ (high love of variety).
A The benchmark model with flexible prices

For clarity, it is convenient to refer to the model with a tradeoff between consumption and investment as “variant I”, and to that without a tradeoff as “variant II”.

A.1 Variant I: general equilibrium and aggregate accounting

A slight complication of our model is dealing with investment in a real setup based on monopolistic competition. But a series of straightforward assumptions make its solution nearly standard. As explained in the text, variant I assumes that consumers allocate their revenues between consumption and investment, and that the amount going to investment eventually finds its way in the hands of lawyers who spend their earnings on consumption goods. We justify this formally by assuming that lawyers have the same utility function as consumers, except that they have an infinite time discount factor, so they undertake no investment. Thus, total consumption, $C^T_t$, equals consumers’ consumption, $C_t$, plus lawyers’ consumption, $C^L_t$. The CES consumption index can therefore be written as:

$$C^T_t = A_t \left( \int_{N_t} (c_t + c^L_t)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \, di \right)^{\theta/(\theta-1)}$$

where $c_t$ and $c^L_t$ represent consumers’ and lawyers’ respective consumption of an individual firm’s output. To find optimal demand for a firm’s variety, it is useful to think of a social planner, choosing $c^T_t = c_t + c^L_t$ in order to maximize total consumption, $C^T_t$ as defined above, subject to $\int_{N_t} p_t c^T_t \, di = Z_t$, where $Z_t$ equals total expenditures, or $Y_t$. Then, following the usual steps, it can be shown that:

$$c^T_t = y_t = \rho^{-\theta} A_t^{\theta-1} Y_t$$

which is equation (16) in the text.

In turn, this equation can be used as the demand function facing a monopolistically competitive firm choosing its optimal price, $p_t$, to maximize profits. In the usual way, we find that $p_t = [\theta/(\theta - 1)] \cdot MC_t$, where $MC_t$ stands for marginal costs, as in equation (3) in the text.
From these pricing and demand equations, as well as the real wage equation (17) in the text, it is simple to find the equation for firm profits, central to our model given its role in the Euler equation for shares. We write:

\[
\frac{d_t}{\theta N_t} = \left( \rho_t - \frac{\omega_t}{Z_t} \right) y_t \\
= \left( \rho_t - \rho_t \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right) y_t \\
= \frac{1}{\theta} \rho_t y_t \\
= \frac{Y_t}{\theta N_t}
\]  

(32) where the last line makes use of the optimal demand equation (31) above.

Finally, we check that general equilibrium holds by focussing on the aggregate accounting condition (21) in the text, repeated here in real terms for simplicity:

\[
C_t + v_t N_{E,t} = \omega_t L_t + d_t N_t
\]

Focussing on the right hand side, we write:

\[
C_t + v_t N_{E,t} = \omega_t L_t + d_t N_t \\
= \omega_t \left( \frac{y_t}{Z_t} \right) N_t + \left( \rho_t - \frac{\omega_t}{Z_t} \right) y_t N_t \\
= \omega_t \left( \frac{y_t}{Z_t} \right) N_t + \rho_t y_t N_t - \frac{\omega_t}{Z_t} y_t N_t \\
= \rho_t y_t N_t \\
= N_t \frac{\theta}{\theta} Z_t L_t \\
= Y_t
\]  

(33) where the second line makes use of the firm production function, (1) in the text, the third and fourth lines are algebra, the fifth line makes use of the definition of \( \rho_t \), (11) in the text, the firm production function and the labor accounting constraint, and finally, the sixth line interprets the equation in line five as a production function, as would have resulted from simply taking firm specific production \( y_t \) and multiplying by the number of firms \( N_t \) and \( \rho_t \) to get an aggregate real value.

Thus, consumption plus investment in new firms, the left hand side of the aggregate accounting equation, does equal aggregate output, as necessary for general equilibrium to hold. Note that this allows us to write \( d_t = (Y_t - \omega_t L_t)/N_t \), a condition that is useful to double check certain results in the text, such as the equation for real wages.
A.2 Variant I: steady state analysis

The following equations in steady state provide useful results and strengthen our intuitive understanding of the model. We define the steady state as the period when all variables are stationary; in particular, inflation is zero and there is no consumption growth.

First, the Euler equation in bonds yields the important and classic result that:

\[ R = \frac{1}{\beta} \]  

(34)

Second, the Euler equation in shares can be simplified to a useful form:

\[ 1 = \beta(1 - \delta) \frac{d + v}{v} \]  

(35)

Importantly, the free entry condition will serve to determine the number of firms in the economy. The complicated expression for firm value formerly seen in (4) simplifies to:

\[ v = \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} [\beta(1 - \delta)]^{s-t} d_s \]

which, after realizing that the above is an infinite geometric series lacking its first term, yields:

\[ v = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)} - 1 \right) d \]  

(36)

For convenience, we call the term in parentheses the long term discount factor and label it \( D \). We can also check that solving the Euler equation in shares (35) for \( v \) also yields expression (36) above. The system’s equations are therefore in agreement.

The free entry condition gives us:

\[ v = f_E \]  

(37)

The equation of motion of firms (6) in steady state yields:

\[ N = \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} N_E \]  

(38)

So the profit equation can be written as:

\[ d = \frac{C}{\partial N} + \frac{f_E \delta}{(1 - \delta) \theta} \]  

(39)
Also, from (37) and (36), we deduce that:

\[ d = \frac{f_E}{D} \]  

(40)

Thus, as entry costs increase, profits also increase. This relationship can be explained with arguments similar to those underlying the variety effect on aggregate prices. Indeed, as entry costs increase, there are fewer firms surviving at steady state, but each firm will produce more thus increasing profits which are entirely dependent on the volume of sales since margins are fixed.

From these flow the two main steady state equations which we repeat and discuss in the text:

\[ N = \left(1 - \frac{\delta}{\xi(1+\varphi)}\right) \left[ Z^{(1+\varphi)} \left(\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}\right)^{\varphi} N^{\xi(1+\varphi)} C^{-\gamma\varphi} - C \right] / f_E \]  

(41)

And the Euler equation in shares:

\[ C = f_E N \theta \left(1 - \frac{\beta(1-\delta)}{\beta(1-\delta)} - \frac{\delta}{(1-\delta)\theta}\right) \]  

(42)

Finally, the steady state equation for the number of new firms can be deduced from the equation for \( N \). For clarity, we reiterate:

\[ N_E = \left[ Z^{(1+\varphi)} \left(\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}\right)^{\varphi} N^{\xi(1+\varphi)} C^{-\gamma\varphi} - C \right] / f_E \]  

(43)

Going one step further, we find that as expected, the number of firms decreases when entry costs rise. Formally:

\[ \frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} = \frac{1}{\xi(1+\varphi) - \gamma\varphi - 1} \Psi \frac{1 - \xi(1+\varphi) + \gamma\varphi + 1}{\xi(1+\varphi) - \gamma\varphi - 1} \left[ \left(1 + \frac{1-\delta}{\delta} \theta\Phi\right) \Theta^{-1} + \Xi \Theta^{-2} \left(1 - \delta \right) Z^{1+\varphi} \left(\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}\right) \gamma\varphi \theta\Phi \left(\theta f_E \Phi\right)^{-\gamma\varphi - 1}\right] \]  

(44)

where:

\[ \Psi = \Xi \Theta^{-1} \]

and,

\[ \Xi = f_E + \frac{1 - \delta}{\delta} \theta f_E \Phi \]
and,
\[
\Theta \equiv \left(1 - \frac{\delta}{\delta}\right) Z^{1+\varphi} \left(\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}\right)^\varphi \left(\theta f_E \Phi\right)^{-\gamma \varphi}
\]
and,
\[
\Phi \equiv \frac{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)}{\beta(1 - \delta)} - \frac{\delta}{(1 - \delta)\theta}
\]

From inspection of equation (44), we note that all terms are positive, except for the first. Indeed, the condition supporting our intuition that the number of firms decreases with a rise in sunk entry costs summarizes to:
\[
\frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} < 0, \quad \text{if} \quad \xi < 1, \quad \text{for} \quad \gamma = 1
\]
which, in fact, imposes a natural constraint on \(\xi\).

It is also possible to show that sign of \(\frac{\partial C}{\partial f_E}\) is positive, as the condition boils down to:
\[
\frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} \frac{f_E}{f_E} N \left(\frac{f_E \theta \Phi}{\hat{N}_t} + 1\right) - \left(1 - \beta(1 - \delta)\right) E_t \left[\hat{N}_{t+1}\right] + \left(\delta \beta \theta\right) E_t \left[\hat{N}_{E,t+1}\right] + \left(\delta \beta \theta + \beta(1 - \delta)\right) E_t \left[\hat{f}_{E,t+1}\right] - \hat{f}_{E,t}
\]
which is always true since all terms are positive and \(\frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} < 0\) as shown above. This supports our intuition mentioned in the text that when fewer firms exist in equilibrium, a lower level of investment (thus higher consumption) is necessary to replace exiting firms.

### A.3 Variant I: main linearized equations

The central system of difference equations in \(C_t\) and \(N_t\) is constituted by the Euler equation in shares and the equation of motion of firms, after solving for \(N_{E,t}\). This yields (were variables without time subscripts refer to steady state values and “hats” indicate percent deviations from steady state):
\[
\hat{N}_t = (1 - \delta) \left[\hat{N}_{t-1} + \frac{N_E}{N} \hat{N}_{E,t-1}\right]
\]
where \(N\) and \(N_E\) are specified in equations (41) and (43) above.

And the second equation is:
\[
-\gamma \hat{C}_t = \left(1 - \beta(1 - \delta) - \frac{\delta \beta}{\theta} - \gamma\right) E_t \left[\hat{C}_{t+1}\right] - (1 - \beta(1 - \delta)) E_t \left[\hat{N}_{t+1}\right] + \left(\frac{\delta \beta}{\theta}\right) E_t \left[\hat{N}_{E,t+1}\right] + \left(\frac{\delta \beta}{\theta} + \beta(1 - \delta)\right) E_t \left[\hat{f}_{E,t+1}\right] - \hat{f}_{E,t}
\]
\[
\text{This is also true for} \ \Phi \ \text{which is positive if} \ \theta > [\beta \delta/(1 - \beta(1 - \delta))], \ \text{a condition that is easily satisfied given the plausible range of our parameter values.}
\]
The remaining equation specifying the number of entering firms (also portrayed in figure 1) is:

\[ \hat{N}_{E,t} = \frac{\Lambda}{f_E N_E} \left[ (1 + \varphi) \hat{Z}_t + \xi (1 + \varphi) \hat{N}_t - \gamma \varphi \hat{C}_t \right] - \frac{C}{f_E N_E} \hat{C}_t - \hat{f}_{E,t} \]  

(47)

where

\[ \Lambda \equiv \left( \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \right)^\varphi Z^{1 + \varphi} N^{\xi (1 + \varphi)} C^{-\gamma \varphi} \]

and where \( C \) is determined in equation (42) above.

**A.4 Variant II: the modified equations**

In contrast to variant I in which entry costs are financed by consumers, paid by firms to lawyers, then used for lawyers’ consumption, we assume in this variant that lawyers rebate their revenues to consumers in the form of transfer payments. This makes the consumption decision independent of the investment decision, as discussed below. This variant is important to consider mainly in order to contrast results with variant I, and thereby emphasize the importance of the consumption-investment decision as the main source of inertia in our model.

In variant II, we write the budget constraint as:

\[ P_t C_t + M_t + R_t^{-1} B_t + v_t (N_t + N_{E,t}) x_t = M_{t-1} + B_{t-1} + W_t L_t + (d_{t} + v_t) N_t x_{t-1} + f_{E,t} N_{E,t} x_t + T_t \]

(48)

where \( f_{E,t} N_{E,t} x_t \) are total entry fees received by lawyers. This term is central to this second variant of the benchmark model. By making use of the free entry condition (5), note that the amount consumers allocate to financing new firm entry, \( v_t N_{E,t} x_t \), exactly equals the sum rebated to them by lawyers, \( f_{E,t} N_{E,t} x_t \). Thus, there is no tradeoff between consuming and financing firm entry. In other words, the consumption smoothing objective does not constrain investment or firm entry from being particularly jagged.

As a result, the Euler equation in shares becomes:

\[ C_t^{-\gamma} = \beta E_t \left[ \frac{d_{t+1} + v_{t+1}}{v_t} \left( \frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t} \right) C_{t+1}^{-\gamma} \right] \]

(49)

And the equation for firm value naturally emanates as a forward solution to the above first order condition:

\[ v_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left( \frac{C_s}{C_t} \right)^{-\gamma} \left( \frac{N_s}{N_t} \right) d_s \right] \]

(50)
where we use the ratio of future firms to today’s to capture the proportion of firms surviving the death shock, and no longer \((1 - \delta)\), as in variant I.

Importantly, the equation for profits, (20) in the text, also changes, but we introduce it below in the discussion on the goods market clearing condition.

### A.5 Variant II: equilibrium conditions

#### A.5.1 Aggregate accounting

When imposing the equilibrium conditions as in the text, we can simplify the budget constraint to:

\[
P_tC_t = W_tL_t + d_t^pN_t
\]

which we call the aggregate accounting equation.

Note that the right hand side is the economy’s GDP, comprised of labor and profit revenue as in variant I, but the left hand side represents consumption only. Investment in new firms, as mentioned before, cancels out with the kickback received from lawyers.

#### A.5.2 The goods market

We know that at the firm level, \(y_t = c_t\), or equivalently, using (16), \(y_t = \rho_t^{-\theta} A^{\theta-1} C_t = N_t^{-\xi-1} C_t\); we call this the firm level equilibrium condition which does not hold in variant I as discussed earlier. We then make use of the aggregate production function specified in the text, \(Y_t = N_t \rho_t y_t\). Taken together, these two equations yield:

\[
Y_t = C_t
\]

which represents aggregate equilibrium in the goods market. Note that the equivalent condition in variant I equated output to consumption plus net investment.

Alternatively, we could have started by the equilibrium condition at the firm level, \(y_t = c_t\), and integrated both sides using the same power mean function as in (9), including multiplying both sides by \(A_t\), such that:

\[
A_t \left( \int_{N_t} y_t^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \, di \right)^{\theta/(\theta-1)} = A_t \left( \int_{N_t} c_t^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \, di \right)^{\theta/(\theta-1)}
\]

Then, we notice that the right hand side is equivalent to aggregate consumption \(C_t\) and the left to \(Y_t\). The former is evident from the CES index
given in (9). The later comes from simplifying the integral under the assumption that $y_t$ is equal for all firms, yielding $N_t^{\xi+1} y_t$ which is equivalent to $Y_t$ as per the aggregate production function $Y_t = N_t \rho y_t$.

Importantly, the equation for profits now becomes:

$$d_t = \frac{C_t}{\theta N_t}$$

thus changing the Euler equation in shares.

A.5.3 The labor market

The equation for real wages (17), as well as the labor supply function (13), yield a first relationship between the number of firms and consumption, given total labor employed (see equation 18 in the text).

Alternatively, the labor market accounting condition, $L_t = N_t l_t$, coupled with the firm level production function (1) as well as the aggregate production function in the form $Y_t = N_t^{\xi+1} y_t$, yield a second expression for total labor employed (or labor needed to produce a certain amount of output):

$$L_t = N_t^{-\xi} C_t Z_t$$

Note that this equation is only true given the simple goods market equilibrium condition (52) above, which is not satisfied in variant I, since total output in the economy is given by consumption plus investment output.

Together, equations (18) and (54) yield an expression for the number of firms as a function of consumption and exogenous variables:

$$N_t = C_t^{\frac{(1+\gamma)}{(1+\phi)}} Z_t^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \right)^{\frac{\phi}{(\phi+1)}}$$

At this point, two important comments are called for. First, contrarily to variant I, we lack an additional constraint limiting entry and allowing us to find $N_{E,t}$ as a by-product of the aggregate accounting condition, or the labor market equilibrium.\textsuperscript{18} At a deeper level, since entry fees are a transfer and thus consumption and investment are orthogonal, there is no constraint on the financing of new firms. Thus, in this variant, we backtrack $N_{E,t}$ from the equation of motion of firms (6), after solving for the dynamic path of $N_t$. We discuss model dynamics in more details in section A.7 below.

\textsuperscript{18}The latter is as in Bilbiie et al. (2005), since they assume entry absorbs labor, thus imposing an additional constraint on labor market accounting.
Second, it may be surprising to notice that \( N_t \) does not depend on \( f_{E,t} \), the cost of entry. Intuitively, if this cost were to increase, fewer firms would enter and vice versa; we would thus expect to find a negative relationship between \( N_t \) and \( f_{E,t} \). The reason we do not is that both \( N_t \) and \( C_t \) depend on \( f_{E,t} \); the latter thus cancels from expression (55). The ensuing steady state analysis confirms this relationship, and thus our intuition outlined above.

### A.6 Variant II: steady state

The steady state results are very similar to those of variant I, presented in (A.2) above. The equations that change are the following.

First, the Euler equation in shares:

\[
1 = \beta \frac{d + v}{v} \tag{56}
\]

Second, and in conformity with the above, the equation for firm value becomes:

\[
v = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} - 1 \right) d \tag{57}
\]

For convenience, we again call the term in parentheses the long term discount factor and label it \( D \).

Third, the profit equation becomes:

\[
d = \frac{C}{\theta N} \tag{58}
\]

and equation (40) still holds.

Fourth, considerations of labor market equilibrium, as shown in the text, yield a new and central equation to variant II linking the number of firms and consumption, as per equation (55):

\[
N = C \frac{(1 + \varphi)}{1 + (\varphi + 1)} Z^{-\frac{1}{\varphi}} \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right)^{-\frac{\varphi}{\theta (\varphi + 1)}} \tag{59}
\]

This equation, along with the profit equation (40) and the alternate expression above for profits (58) suggest an expression for \( N \) in terms of \( f_{E} \) and other exogenous variables:

\[
N = \left[ \left( \frac{\theta f_{E}}{D} \right)^{1+\varphi} \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right)^{\varphi} Z^{-(\varphi + 1)} \right]^{-\frac{1}{(\varphi + 1) - (1 + \varphi)}} \tag{60}
\]
Plugging this particular result back into the profit equation yields a companion expression for consumption or output as a function of $f_E$ and other exogenous variables:

$$C = \left( \frac{\theta f_E}{D} \right) \left( \frac{\xi}{(\varphi + 1) - (1 + \varphi \gamma)} \right) \left( \frac{\theta}{\theta - 1} \right)^{\varphi} \left( \frac{Z}{(\varphi + 1) - (1 + \varphi \gamma)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\xi}}$$

(61)

To develop intuition for these complicated, yet central, expressions, it is useful to first analyze how both the number of firms and consumption or output vary with changes in entry costs $f_E$. To start with, consider

$$\frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} = \left( \frac{1 + \gamma \varphi}{\xi (\varphi + 1) - (1 + \varphi \gamma)} \right) N$$

(62)

Since we know that $\frac{N}{f_E}$ is positive, we concentrate instead on finding the sign on the term in parentheses. Inspection tells us that the numerator is positive. Thus, if we assume $\gamma = 1$ as we do in our simulations, we arrive at the condition:

$$\frac{\partial N}{\partial f_E} < 0 \quad \text{iff} \quad 0 \leq \xi < 1$$

which is the same as that found for variant I.

### A.7 Variant II: main linearized equations

Given the above derivations, simplifications and discussions, we retain two principle equations as sufficient to describe the system’s dynamics: the labor market condition (55) linking today’s number of firms with today’s consumption, as well as the Euler equation in shares (49), capturing the intertemporal relationship between the two state variables. When log-linearized, these two equations become:

$$\hat{N}_t = \frac{(1 + \gamma \varphi)}{\xi (\varphi + 1)} \hat{C}_t + (1 - \theta) \hat{Z}_t$$

(63)

and

$$-\gamma \hat{C}_t = (1 - \beta - \gamma) E_t [\hat{C}_{t+1}] + \beta E_t [\hat{N}_{t+1}] - \hat{N}_t$$

$$+ \beta \hat{f}_{E,t+1} - \hat{f}_{E,t}$$

(64)

where we made use of the free entry condition (5) and the steady state results that $\frac{C}{f_E \theta \gamma} + 1 = \frac{1}{\beta}$ to simplify the above. Note that by plugging (63) into (64), we remain with just one difference equation in consumption, which is
sufficient to find the dynamic paths of all variables. This is a particularity of variant II.

Finally, to find the path of $N_{E,t}$, also shown in figure 2, we linearize the equation of motion of firms (6):

$$\hat{N}_t = (1 - \delta)\hat{N}_{t-1} + \delta\hat{N}_{E,t-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (65)

## B Model with sticky entry costs

### B.1 Deriving lawyers’ optimal fees

The representative lawyer maximizes her profit function given by:

$$\max_{N_{E,t}} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k E_t \left[ \beta^k \left( f_{E,t}^n N_{E,t+k} - TC_{t+k}^n(N_{E,t+k}) \right) \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (66)

as in the text, facing a horizontal demand curve, since lawyers are non-differentiated.

The first order condition yields:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \lambda^k E_t \left[ \beta^k \left( f_{E,t}^{n*} - MC_{t+k}^n \right) \right] = 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (67)

Note, of course, that if this were a one period problem (i.e. the lawyer was able to reset her fees freely), then the optimal fee, $f_{E,t}^{n*}$, would equal $MC_{t+k}^n$, as prescribed by the theory of perfect competition.

We then recall from the text the definition of marginal costs, $MC_{t+k}^n = f_{E} P_t$, so that in steady state, $f_{E}^n = MC^n = f_{E}^{n*}$. With this useful result, we can linearize the above condition to yield:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda \beta)^k E_t \left[ f_{E,t}^{n*} - \hat{MC}_{t+k}^n \right] = 0$$

which can be solved for the lawyer’s optimal price:

$$\hat{f}_{E,t}^{n*} = (1 - \lambda \beta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\lambda \beta)^k E_t [\hat{MC}_{t+k}^n]$$

To simplify, we note first that $\hat{MC}_{t+k}^n = \hat{P}_{t+k}$ given the above definition of marginal costs. We then take the first term of the above equation, i.e.
when \( k = 0 \), and write all remaining terms as \( \hat{f}_{E,t+1}^* \) but discounted by \( \lambda \beta \). This yields:

\[
\hat{f}_{E,t}^* = (1 - \lambda \beta) \hat{P}_t + \lambda \beta E_t \left[ \hat{f}_{E,t+1}^* \right]
\]

(68)

or, in real terms, by noting that \( \hat{f}_{E,t}^* = \hat{f}_{E,t}^* + \hat{P}_t \):

\[
\hat{f}_{E,t}^* = \lambda \beta (E_t \left[ \hat{P}_{t+1} \right] - \hat{P}_t) + \lambda \beta E_t \left[ \hat{f}_{E,t+1}^* \right]
\]

(69)

which is the same as in the text and in the same form as the usual optimal price derived with Calvo (1983)-type rigidities. The same result could have been obtained by supposing that lawyers were imperfectly differentiated, as is more traditional in Calvo-type setups, yet as would have been difficult to conceptualize given our model and story. Dealing with a representative lawyer faced with a probability of not being able to reset her price contributes to the simplicity of our model.

**B.2 Additional linearized equations**

The equation for money demand, from (12):

\[
\nu \hat{M}_t - \nu \hat{P}_t = \gamma \hat{C}_t - \frac{\hat{R}_t}{\sigma}
\]

(70)

where we made use of the fact that \( R = 1/\beta \) in steady state as in (34) and we define \( \beta \equiv 1/(1 + \sigma) \) as in Gali and Gertler (1999), where \( \sigma \) is the subjective discount parameter.

The Euler equation in bonds, from (14):

\[
-\gamma \hat{C}_t = \hat{R}_t - \gamma E_t[\hat{C}_{t+1}] - E_t[\hat{P}_{t+1} - \hat{P}_t]
\]

(71)

The equation for production output, or real GDP, from (19):

\[
\hat{Y}_t = \xi \hat{N}_t + \hat{L}_t + \hat{Z}_t
\]

(72)

The equation for real wages, from (17):

\[
\hat{\omega}_t = \xi \hat{N}_t + \hat{Z}_t
\]

(73)

The equation for labor supply, from (18):

\[
\hat{L}_t = \varphi \xi \hat{N}_t - \varphi \gamma \hat{C}_t + \varphi \hat{Z}_t
\]

(74)
The equation for the real interest rate:

\[ \hat{RR}_t \equiv \hat{R}_t - E_t(\hat{P}_{t+1} - \hat{P}_t) \]  

(75)

The equation for inflation:

\[ \Pi_t \equiv \hat{P}_t - \hat{P}_{t-1} \]  

(76)

And the equation for money growth:

\[ \hat{M}_t = (1 + \rho_M)\hat{M}_{t-1} - \rho_M\hat{M}_{t-2} + u_t \]  

(77)

where \( u_t = \epsilon_t/M \).